Honorable Mayor and Members
of the City Council
City Hall
Torrance, California

Members of the Council and Commission:

SUBJECT: Accept and File Proposed Homelessness Report, Approve City Homeless Plan, and Approve Homeless Task Force

RECOMMENDATION

Recommendation of the Social Services Commission that the City Council:
1. Accept and file proposed homelessness report by the Social Services Commission; and
2. Approve staff’s recommendation that the Social Services Commission prioritize the creation of a City homeless plan, and return to Council for its adoption and for quarterly updates on progress; and
3. Approve staff’s recommendation to direct the City Manager to explore creating a Homeless Task Force comprised of City staff and partnering agencies.

BACKGROUND

At the City Council meeting on June 4, 2019, Councilman Mattucci sought the concurrence of his colleagues for staff to bring back an item to City Council so that the Council can discuss the growing number of people experiencing homelessness in Torrance. In particular, Councilman Mattucci requested an item so that the City can seek all legal options to help individuals experiencing homelessness to be off the streets and into programs to help them, seek all available resources and service providers, and look into what other cities are doing in regards to camping (public and private property) and generally living on the streets. Councilman Mattucci brought this up because he noted that some neighboring cities have completely neglected the issue of homelessness, and that there is plenty of funding available. He brought this matter to the Council to ensure that the City gets a head start on homeless issues.

At the Social Services Commission meeting on June 27, 2019, the Social Services Commission directed staff to produce a report, to be forward to City Council, which addresses the following areas:

1. A review of relevant laws related to homelessness, including ordinances other municipalities have adopted to address homelessness;
2. Findings of the Torrance Social Services Commission in its work with people experiencing homelessness;
3. Current action of Torrance Departments; and
4. Ideas the City may wish to adopt that will truly help people experiencing homelessness.
At the Social Services Commission meeting on September 26, 2019, the Social Services Commission approved the Homelessness Report prepared by staff, which includes the following components:

1. A summary of laws of local cities related to quality of life and homelessness. Staff reviewed public information from neighboring cities on ordinances that could be used in matters pertaining to quality of life. The ordinances identified in the report may or may not be used to the extent of addressing homelessness.
2. A summary of the Commission's work related to homelessness.
3. A summary of City efforts in addressing homelessness.

ANALYSIS

The Commission developed its workplan in 2016, which was received and filed by City Council on November 22, 2016. The workplan includes strategies for all four of the populations in the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction: people experiencing homelessness, veterans, adults with developmental disabilities and youth with special needs.

The Commission has spent a significant amount of time over the past few years working to understand homelessness and solutions. The Commission has gained a better foundational knowledge of homelessness in Torrance and throughout LA County in large part to the following partnering agencies, whom have presented to the Commission:

- Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA)
- South Bay Coalition to End Homelessness
- Los Angeles County Homeless Initiative
- Torrance Unified School District's Building Bridges Program
- Harbor Interfaith Services
- 1736 Family Crisis Center
- South Bay Family Promise

In the three years since the workplan was developed, homelessness has changed significantly. In response to this change, staff believes that now is an appropriate time to reconsider separating strategies to address homelessness from the remainder of the workplan.

Specifically, staff believes that creating a homeless plan would allow for community input in addressing quality of life issues related to homelessness. A homeless plan may also open the door for funding opportunities, as having an adopted homeless plan has been a criteria for receiving Measure H City Implementation funds.

The Los Angeles County Homeless Imitative issued an RFP in 2017 for municipalities to retain consultants using funds from Measure H to develop city homeless plans. City staff did speak to several prospective consultants to determine if pursuing these funds would be beneficial to our community at that time. Because the Commission already had a workplan that included, in part, strategies for addressing homelessness, staff did not apply for these funds.

In writing this report to City Council, staff reached out to the South Bay Cities Council of Governments (SBCCOG) to query about potential funding, should the Council concur with the Commission’s recommendation to create a homeless plan. Staff learned that at the end of October, the Homeless Initiative is requesting that the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors divide a portion of Measure H funds among the eight Council of Governments. Should the Board
of Supervisors concur with the Homeless Initiative’s recommendation, SBCCOG will then recommend to its board in early 2020 to prioritize part of the SBCCOG’s allocation to provide funds for Torrance to retain a consultant to create a homeless plan. In the SBCCOG, seven cities currently have a homeless plan, including Carson, El Segundo, Hawthorne, Hermosa, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach and Redondo Beach.

It should also be noted that cities across the United States may be affected by the pending outcome of the Martin vs. City of Boise court case. In summary, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that cities will not be able to punish or arrest people for sleeping on public property unless the cities provide adequate and relatively accessible shelter. The court explained it was unconstitutional to enforce such “camping” laws, as it was considered cruel and unusual punishment. The court decision, which was filed on April 1st, 2019, has since been affecting the legality of similar municipal codes enforced by law enforcement in the western United States. It should be noted that numerous cities, including the City of Torrance, have already filed amicus briefs asking the U.S. Supreme Court to challenge the case. Attachments B, C, and D contain more information regarding the case.

Furthermore, while significant efforts are continually made by City departments to connect homeless individuals with services, the City has not had a coordinated effort to bring together all relevant City departments and community-based agencies to conduct outreach to people experiencing homelessness in Torrance. As such, the Commission is recommending that the City Council direct the City Manager to explore creating a homeless outreach team comprised of City staff and partnering agencies.

Respectfully submitted,

Cindy Scotto
Social Services Commission Chair

LeRoy J. Jackson
City Manager

Noted:

Attachment A: Homelessness Report
Attachment B: Martin v City of Boise 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir 2019)
Attachment C: Brief for Amici Curiae California State Assoc of Counties and 33 California Cities and Counties
Attachment D: Renne Public Law Group Press Release dated September 24, 2019
Attachment E: Correspondence
Torrance Social Services Commission's Report on Homelessness

Part I: City Ordinances and Plans to Address Quality of Life

The information in this report was compiled to show the different approaches cities may take when responding to citizen concerns related to quality of life and homelessness. The cities listed in the chart below were selected based on geographical proximity, (i.e. South Bay cities), geographical size and population count. In writing this report, staff only reviewed available public information of ordinances that could be used in matters pertaining to quality of life. The ordinances listed may or may not be enforced or used to the extent of addressing homelessness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>City Ordinances</th>
<th>Homelessness Plan</th>
<th>Lead Department</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torrance</td>
<td>146,860</td>
<td>• 45.1.1 – Loitering</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Police Department, Mental Health Evaluation Team (MET), Homeless Task Force, and City Manager’s Office</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• 45.1.2 – Loitering on Business Parking Lots or at Places of Business</td>
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<td>• 45.1.3 – Trespassing on or Loitering About Certain Classes of Property</td>
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<td>• 45.1.4 – Standing or Sitting on streets, sidewalks, etc., so as to Obstruction Free Passage</td>
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<td>• 45.1.5 – Churches, Theaters, etc., Obstructing Entrance</td>
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<td>• 45.1.6 – Trespassing on Private Property</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhattan Beach</td>
<td>35,741</td>
<td>• 18.0020 – Anti-Camping</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Police Department, Mental Health Evaluation Team (MET), Homeless Task Force, and City Manager’s Office</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• 4.140.030 – Unlawful Camping</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 4.140.040 – Storage of Personal Property on Public and Private Property</td>
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<tr>
<td>Redondo Beach</td>
<td>67,908</td>
<td>• 4.34.02 – Unlawful Camping</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mental Health Evaluation Team (MET) and Community Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4.34.03 – Storage of Personal Property in Public Spaces</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4.32.01 – Police Response at Loud or Unruly Assemblies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hermosa Beach</td>
<td>19,653</td>
<td>• 10.12.090 – Camping or Sleeping in Vehicles on Public Streets or Public Parking Lots</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mental Health Evaluation Team (MET) and City Manager’s Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 12.20.240 – Overnight Camping</td>
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<td>• 12.20.330 – Tents</td>
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<td>• 12.20.350 – Obstructing Free Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rancho Palos Verdes</td>
<td>41,928</td>
<td>• 12.20.030 – Overnight Camping within the Palos Verdes Nature Reserve Prohibited</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 12.20.030 – Overnight Camping within the Palos Verdes Nature Preserve Prohibited</td>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Code Violations</td>
<td>Action Taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palos Verdes Estates</td>
<td>13,404</td>
<td>• 12.20.030 – Overnight Camping on Street or Alley</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rolling Hills Estates</td>
<td>1,939</td>
<td>• 9.32.010 – Loitering Prohibited</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rolling Hills Estates</td>
<td>8,141</td>
<td>• 9.40.010 – Unauthorized Remaining on Private Property Prohibited</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carson</td>
<td>91,909</td>
<td>• 4101 – Unnecessary Noises</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>• 4102 – Loitering</td>
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<td>• 4105 – Illegal Dumping</td>
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<td>• 4111 – Trespassing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4129 – Unauthorized Use of Shopping Carts Prohibited</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4146 – Camping on Public Property</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 4147 – Sleeping on Public Property</td>
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<td>Lomita</td>
<td>20,521</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Gardena</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>• 9.20 – Unauthorized Use of Shopping Carts (Removal, Possession, &amp; Use)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 9.60.010 – Obstructing Public Sidewalk</td>
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<td>• 9.60.020 – Obstructing Business Premises</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 9.60.030 - Remaining at Business Open to Public After Being Asked to Leave</td>
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<td>• 10.60 – Regulation of the Parking of Recreational Vehicles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 11.04.180 – Camping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawthorne</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>• 10.36.190 – Use of Streets for Parking and/or Storage of Certain Large Vehicles, Including Recreational Vehicles and House Car, Prohibited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>• 10.72.060 – Obstructing Entrances</td>
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<td>• 10.72.070 – Obstructing Pedestrian Passage</td>
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<td>• 10.72.090 – Loitering in Business Establishment</td>
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<td>• 12.24.010 – Obstructing Sidewalk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawndale</td>
<td>35,754</td>
<td>• 9.12.110 – Dumping</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>• 9.80.030 – Loitering</td>
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<td>• 12.30.030 – Unlawful Camping</td>
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<td>• 12.30.040 – Storage of Personal Property in Public Spaces</td>
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Notes:
- Palos Verdes Estates: No action taken.
- Rolling Hills Estates: No action taken.
- Carson: Homeless Task Force led by City Manager's Office (interdepartmental attendance).
- Lomita: No action taken.
- Gardena: No action taken.
- Hawthorne: Hawthorne Homeless Task Force (HHTF) and Recreation/Community Services Department.
- Lawndale: No action taken.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Related Codes</th>
<th>Code Standard Compliance</th>
<th>Contact/Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| El Segundo   | 16,719     | 7.12.3 – Loud or Unruly Gatherings  
12.32.050 – Disturbing Peace and Quiet (Parks)  
12.32.170 – Overnight Camping (Parks)  
12.32.180 – Overnight Parking (Parks) | Yes                      | Police Department                                  |
| Inglewood    | 115,904    | 3.35 – Obstructing Sidewalks Prohibited            | Yes                      | Homeless Task Force led by Housing and Police Departments |
| Long Beach   | 467,354    | 9.42.110 – Camping Prohibited in Certain Areas  
9.30.050 – Obstructing Public Passage  
14.04.010 – Obstructing Free Passage  
16.08.490 – Obstruction of Access  | **No official homelessness plan, but the City is a service providing agency.** | Health & Human Services |
| Downey       | 112,269    | 4104 – Loitering: Public Places of Assemblage  
4106 – Loitering on Streets or Sidewalks | No                       | n/a                                                |
| Pomona       | 152,361    | 46-603 – Unlawful Camping  
46-604 – Unlawful Areas to Sleep  
34-155 – Loitering  
34-156 – Loitering Prohibited on Private Parking Lots | Yes                      | Continuum of Care Program                         |
| El Monte     | 115,586    | 9.48.020 – Unlawful Camping  
9.48.030 – Storage of Personal Property in Public Places | Yes                      | Community Services                                |
| Pasadena     | 141,371    | 12.12.080 – Persons Obstructing Public Way or Place | No                       | n/a                                                |
| Burbank      | 103,695    | 5-3-207 – Obstructing Public Sidewalks and Parkways | Yes                      | Burbank Street Outreach Program  
(Community Development Department), Library Services Department, Police Department Mental Health Evaluation Team (MHET) |
| Palmdale     | 156,667    | 8.24.260 – Overnight Camping | Yes                      | Neighborhood Services                              |
City of Redondo Beach

In 2014, the City of Redondo Beach formed a Homeless Task Force led by residents to find collaborative ways to address homelessness and to make recommendations to staff under the direction of the City Manager. Redondo Beach has separate contracts with Harbor Interfaith and PATH. They previously received funding from United Way to align with the Coordinated Entry System (CES). A key recommendation included the need to contract with a coordinated outreach provider to ensure availability of homeless services.

Using Measure H grant funds, the City drafted a “Five-Year Plan to Address Homelessness” dated April 2, 2019. Over the course of three (3) months (January, February, and March), 22 meeting were hosted by the City’s consulting team. A total of 290 participants from the business community, affiliates of faith-based communities, residents, and County and City employees. Additionally, 169 people responded to a survey posted on the City’s website. Community outreach meetings determined that the homeless population in Redondo Beach can be described as follows: 1) chronically homeless individuals, 2) recently or situationally homeless people, 3) transition age youth (ages 16-24), 4) transients, and 5) people at imminent risk of homelessness. The plan also included five (5) goals and supporting actions, each with a designated policy change, goal measurement and ownership, leveraged city resources, and a timeline. The five (5) goals are listed as follows: 1) Continue to develop and strengthen City’s response to homelessness while ensuring community safety, 2) Expand community education efforts around homelessness and raise awareness about available resources and best practices, 3) Improve and expand local and regional homeless services, 4) To prevent homelessness among Redondo Beach residents, and 5) Support appropriate local and regional opportunities toward increasing access to crisis and supportive housing, shelters, and affordable housing for at-risk populations in the Beach Cities area.

City Manhattan Beach

On August 21, 2018, through direction of the City Council, a Homelessness Task Force was formed to assist City staff with developing a proposal for the County to acquire Measure H funds and to conduct community outreach and education on homelessness.

The City’s “Five-Year Plan to Address Homelessness in Our Community” was adopted by the City Council on August 21, 2018. The plan contains seven (7) goals, along with long term and short term supporting actions, policy changes, goal measurement and ownership, and a timeline. The seven (7) goals are listed
as follows: 1) To ensure resident safety and wellbeing by supporting Police Department, Fire Department, and City staff in responding appropriately, safely, and effectively to persons who are experiencing homelessness in Manhattan Beach, 2) To help residents and businesses to respond safely and effectively to individuals who are homeless in Manhattan Beach, 3) To share responsibility for addressing homelessness with neighboring cities, in order to expand permanent solutions to homelessness, 4) To support faith groups to effectively help individuals experiencing homelessness in Manhattan Beach, 5) To reduce homelessness among Manhattan Beach residents, 6) To improve city response to homelessness by obtaining additional resources to address homelessness in Manhattan Beach, and by creating efficiencies in the use of current resources, and 7) To support the availability of regional housing opportunities in the South Bay for population at risk of homelessness. Furthermore, the plan outlines the relationship between the City’s efforts and the Los Angeles County Homeless Initiative strategies, and other collaborative opportunities the City aspires to participate in.

A Homeless Resource Guide was created to educate the community on the homeless resources available throughout the South Bay. The guide also includes a Homeless Resource Card was contact information to the Manhattan Beach Police Department, Homeless Information Line, Harbor Interfaith Services, and the Department of Mental Health Hotline.

City of Hermosa Beach

The Hermosa Beach City Council adopted a preliminary “Homeless Strategy and Action Plan” in November 2015. In November 2017, the City of Hermosa Beach was awarded Measure H grant funding from the County to develop a five-year plan to address homelessness. From February through May 2018, the City held four stakeholder meetings, along with an online public engagement campaign, to identify key issues and solutions related to homelessness. A total of 112 people attended the stakeholder meetings.

On July 24, 2018, the City Council unanimously adopted the “Five-Year Homelessness Plan”. The plan includes five (5) goals, along with supporting actions, associated policy changes, goal measurement and ownership, leveraged City resources, and a timeline. The five (5) goals are listed as follows: 1) Continue to develop and strengthen City’s response to homelessness while ensuring community safety, 2) Expand community educations around homelessness and raise awareness about available resources and best practices, 3) Enhance local and regional coordination, 4) Expand homeless prevention programming, and 5) Support appropriate local/regional opportunities toward increasing access to supportive housing and shelters for at risk populations in the SPA 8 Region.

City of Hawthorne

On July 24, 2018, the City of Hawthorne adopted a resolution to accept a “Five-Year Plan to Address Homelessness in Our Community”. The City’s process for developing a plan to address homelessness consisted of six (6) meetings with participants from the business community, affiliates from faith-based communities, homeless services providers, first responders, residents, and city staff. The City applied for a “Homeless Services-City Planning Grant” from Measure H Funding to receive funding for development of a homeless plan, and the County of Los Angeles granted $30,000 to cover the costs: 1) $22,000 for consultant costs, 2) $4,000 for administrative costs, and 3) $4,000 for community meetings.
The City's five-year plan highlights the different resources offered to address homelessness. For instance, the Police Department has special officers assigned to respond to incidents related to homelessness. The plan also includes eight (8) goals accompanied by short-term and long-term supporting actions. The eight (8) goals are listed as follows: 1) Reduce the incidence of homelessness by providing diversion or homeless prevention strategies to families and single persons at-risk of becoming homeless, 2) Reduce the period of time that families and single persons are homeless, 3) Assist homeless families and single persons to return to self-sufficiency, 4) Improve access to services and housing for families and single persons experiencing homelessness or at risk of homelessness, 5) End homelessness for persons living in the City of Hawthorne by achieving and retaining functional zero, 6) Work collaboratively with the Los Angeles County coordinated entry systems (CES), 7) Participate in coordinated solutions to end homelessness, and 8) Help expand the inventory of affordable housing in the region that is available for homeless populations.

The Hawthorne Homeless Task Force (HHTF) is a collaboration between specialized agencies who analyze, identify, and connect individuals and families to resources and services in the South Bay. Such agencies include: the City of Hawthorne’s Recreation and Community Service Department, Housing Department, and Planning Department, Harbor Interfaith, St. Margaret’s, PATH, faith based organizations, local School District, LAHSA, and SBCCOG. HHTF has hosted community outreach events like the Senior Citizen Intervention and Prevention of Homeless Fair, clothing donations, food and shoe giveaways, and non-perishable food drives.

City of El Segundo

In October 2017, the City of El Segundo was awarded $30,000 in grant funding from Measure H to develop a plan in response to homelessness in their city. Using Measure H funds, Lois Starr, a consultant, was hired to develop a plan to address homelessness in the City of El Segundo. Six (6) community meetings were held throughout March and April 2018 to identify issues and solutions related to homelessness in the City. A total of seven (7) goals, along with supporting actions, policy changes, goal measurement, and goal ownership, were included in the City of El Segundo’s “Plan to Address Homelessness in Our City”. The seven (7) goals are listed as follows: 1) To ensure resident safety and wellbeing by supporting Police Department, Fire Department, and City staff in responding appropriately, safely, and effectively to persons who are experiencing homelessness in El Segundo, 2) To help residents and businesses to respond safely and effectively to individuals who are homeless in El Segundo, 3) To share responsibility for addressing homelessness with neighboring cities, in order to expand permanent solutions to homelessness, 4) To support faith groups to effectively help individuals experiencing homelessness in El Segundo, 5) To reduce homelessness among El Segundo residents, 6) To improve City response to homelessness by obtaining additional resources to address homelessness in El Segundo, and by creating efficiencies in the use of current resources, and 7) To support the availability of regional housing in the South Bay for populations at risk of homelessness.

Additionally, City holds that their plan to address homelessness will: 1) Reconfirm that the City’s priority is the safety and wellbeing of its residents, businesses, and visitors, 2) Create a framework for collaboration with neighboring cities to meet the need for affordable housing in the South Bay region, and 3) Offer effective interventions to people who are homeless in El Segundo, with the goal of engaging them
in services leading to permanent housing. The plan was presented to the El Segundo City Council on August 7, 2018.

The El Segundo Police Department are the first responders to emergency calls and resident concerns involving people experiencing homelessness in the City. Further, the Police Department has specially-trained officers skilled in effectively interacting with people who are mentally ill and/or experiencing homelessness. These officers work in conjunction with City staff from Public Works, Code Enforcement, Legal Services, and Parks and Recreation to manage homelessness in the City. The El Segundo Police Department created six (6) goals to help them continue to engage in proactive efforts to address homelessness: 1) Developed a homeless response plan with the assistance of a homeless coordinator and community input, 2) Staffing of two dedicated officers for homeless outreach efforts, 3) Organized a food drive with a local faith organization to assist those at risk of becoming homeless, 4) Regional collaboration with surrounding jurisdictions to address homelessness, 5) Utilization of a clinician from the Department of Mental Health to assist in helping those that are homeless and/or suffering a mental crisis, and 6) Creation of a beach patrol detail to address unlawful camping/living on the beach.

**City of Inglewood**

The City of Inglewood adopted a Plan to Prevent and Combat Homelessness on June 26, 2018. The City of Inglewood has a Housing Authority with an inventory of approximately 1,000 Housing Choice Vouchers and they receive HOME and CDBG funding from HUD. Inglewood interacts directly with persons experiencing homelessness through their Homeless Tenant Based Rental Assistance and motel voucher programs. The Inglewood Police Department has a Community Affairs Liaison that is active in issues related to homelessness.

**City of Long Beach**

The Long Beach Continuum of Care (CoC) was established in 1995 by the City's Health Department, and serves as a local planning body funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Long Beach CoC coordinates is responsible for receiving public comment, community and public policy updates related to homelessness. A Homeless Services Advisory Committee, comprised of two people, is tasked with making recommendations to the Long Beach CoC Board on policies, programs, and funding sources related to homeless services. The Long Beach CoC is able to record client characteristics and service needs through their Homeless Management Information System (HMIS). This technology helps the Long Beach CoC to better evaluate the delivery and effectiveness of homeless services.

Through its Health & Human Services Department, the City of Long Beach has a Multi-Service Center (MSC) facility serving as the primary access point for individuals who are experiencing homelessness and in dire need of services. The MSC promotes self-sufficiency by offering basic amenities such as medical care, mental health services, and substance abuse treatment with integrated case management and housing coordination.

On May 23, 2017, the Long Beach City Council requested a report from staff to identify a multi-departmental strategic approach for addressing homelessness and community quality of life. On December 18, 2017, staff returned with a memorandum focusing the issues related to homeless and
transient activity, along with a summary of funding sources required to implement a citywide strategy to address homelessness. The report also highlights the work integration of the City’s Homeless Services Division (HSD) with the Police Department and Quality of Life Officers, Fire Department, including the HEART team and Lifeguards, Public Works Department, Parks, Recreation, and Marine Department, and the Library. The HSD is primarily concerned with coordinating outreach and response services to individuals and families experiencing homelessness.

City of Burbank

In December 2017, the Burbank City Council approved a 3-year (2018-2021) action-oriented Homelessness Plan that takes a holistic and humane approach in dealing with homelessness. The City of Burbank believes a Homelessness Plan is important in order to obtain funding, leverage resources, and create new partnerships. The planning process consisted of four (4) community meetings (May - August 2017) to develop the plan, review by inter-departmental staff and AD HOC Homelessness Steering Committee, and lastly, adoption by the City Council. Additionally, the AD HOC Homelessness Steering Committee is tasked with the strategic planning and implementation of the plan. The City’s Homelessness Plan identifies seven (7) actions and strategies to prevent and combat homelessness: 1) Develop storage facilities and transportation, 2) Enhancing the quality of life, mental health, and healthcare awareness, 3) Building temporary housing, 4) Creating affordable housing, 5) Continuing outreach, coordinated care system, and community awareness, 6) Increasing homeless prevention and rapid re-housing, and 7) Enforcing public health and safety and ordinances.

In an effort to address homelessness issues, the City of Burbank provides a comprehensive resource guide for homeless individuals and families, as well as those at-risk of becoming homeless. The resource guide lists over 35 programs and organizations that provide homeless services such as housing and shelter, financial assistance, legal assistance, food, health and wellness, transportations, employment, social and supportive facilities, and general referrals. The City also works with several community partners like the Burbank Temporary Aid Center (BTAC), 2-1-1 LA County, Ascencia, Burbank Housing Corporation (BHC), the Salvation Army, Family Promise of the Verdugos, Family Service Agency, and Volunteers of America of Los Angeles.

City of Pomona

The Pomona Continuum of Care Coalition was established in 1999 to address gaps in homeless services and reduce the duplication of effort from other organizations or agencies. The Continuum of Care Coalition is composed of over 40 agencies including community and faith-based organizations, local government agencies, residents, homeless representatives, and other community stakeholders. The Continuum of Care Coalition meets monthly to discuss how to best provide an “accessible system of services” for individuals and families experiencing homelessness.

The City of Pomona’s Continuum of Care delivers housing and related services to assist individuals who are experiencing homelessness within the community. The Continuum of Care is able to assess and calculate the needs of the homeless through existing funding sources such as the Emergency Shelter Grant (ESG), Supportive Housing Program (SHP), Shelter Plus Care (S+C), and Section 8 Program and Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG). The fundamental components of the Continuum of Care systems are prevention, outreach, intake, and assessment, emergency shelter, transitional housing, permanent and supportive housing, and supportive services. Supportive housing is provided by the Transitional Living Center (a city-administered program) that can house up to six (6) homeless individuals. Lastly, the Continuum of Care funds the Pomona Street Outreach Team, consisting of a Homeless Services Coordinator and a City Homeless Liaison. The Pomona Street Outreach Teams provides homeless individuals and families with street outreach, case management, referrals, and access to services.

The City’s Homeless Services Coordinator was established to serve as a liaison in several capacities such as: a community liaison and primary contact to person for the City regarding homeless issues and services, and as a City liaison to the Pomona Continuum of Care Coalition, LAHSA, and the regional Consortium. The Homeless Services Coordinator is also responsible for coordinating intakes, referrals, and evaluation services for homeless individuals, as well as coordinating service responses amongst the Outreach Team, law enforcement, code enforcement, and other inter-departmental staff as needed. Lastly, the Homeless Services Coordinator is essentially a resource to the City Council, City staff, and community partners, as he/she can provide technical assistance and expertise on issues related to homelessness.

On January 9, 2017, the City of Pomona adopted a plan titled “A Way Home: Community Solutions for Pomona’s Homeless”. An AD HOC Homeless Advisory Committee was specifically created to develop this plan over a nine month period (November 2015 – July 2016). Moreover, the committee was tasked with providing solutions in response to four (4) focus areas: 1) Insufficient Housing and Shelters, 2) Provision of Programs, Services, and Resources, 3) Community Perceptions, and 4) City policies. The end result was a strategic plan that includes four guiding principles: 1) Homelessness is a crisis in Pomona, 2) If homelessness occurs, it should be brief and one-time only, 3) Homelessness is solvable, and 4) Pomona is addressing our fair share, we encourage other cities to do the same. Additionally, the plan embraces four (4) overarching goals: 1) Reduce the number of Pomona’s unsheltered homeless, 2) Reduce the negative impacts on community neighborhoods and public spaces through the coordination of services, 3) Have an engaged and informed community regarding homelessness and homeless solutions, and 4) Balance the needs and rights of homeless persons and the larger community through updated fair, legal, and enforceable policies and ordinances.

On February 28, 2018, as part of the update and planning grant process, the City hosted a Lived Experience Summit for persons (approximately 100) who were currently experiencing homelessness. All attendees were given the opportunity to share their experiences and provide input on the services, operations, and environment for a new shelter. The purpose of the Lived Experience Summit was to provide City staff with a better understanding of the perspectives of individuals experiencing homelessness in Pomona.

On July 2, 2018, the plan was updated to incorporate 30 strategies and over 150 activities aimed at balancing the desire to become a more compassionate community with regard to addressing quality of life issues for all Pomona residents. The City of Pomona, along with its partners, have been actively addressing three (3) urgent strategies: 1) Establish a year-round shelter able to provide for multiple populations, 2) Establish as service center for centralization and coordination of services, and 3) Establish as communal kitchen for the provision of food services.
City of Palmdale

A special City Council workshop was held on June 26, 2018 to present the draft of the City of Palmdale’s “Plan to Prevent and Combat Homelessness”. The City of Palmdale developed this five-year plan to provide an assessment of homelessness and the resources available to address the challenge, as well as outlining opportunities for local and regional collaboration. The plan also includes four (4) locally-developed goals that address the supportive service and housing needs of Palmdale’s residents who are experiencing homelessness. The specific goals are listed as follows: 1) prevent episodes of homelessness within the community, including individuals and families, 2) assist homeless individuals and families by providing relevant and accurate information that creates a path for them to no longer be homeless and also create housing opportunities that meets their needs, 3) empower local service providers, community partners and those with a vested interest to improve their response to individuals and families experiencing homelessness that formulates working as a collective with City support, and 4) develop an approach to track City, local service providers and local community support group progress in preventing, reducing, and ending homelessness to create and maintain a sustainable lifestyle that includes affordable housing, education, and employment/vocational training opportunities. The City of Palmdale anticipates the period of performance for the four (4) goals to be from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2023.

City of El Monte

On June 5, 2018, the City of El Monte adopted the “El Monte Plan to Prevent and Combat Homelessness”. The City was awarded $70,000 in funding from the County of Los Angeles City Planning Grant to develop a 3-year plan to prevent and combat homelessness. The San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments (SGVCOG) and LeSar Development Consultants (LDC) entered an agreement with the City of El Monte to develop the plan. In 2018, LDC hosted a series of meetings throughout February and April, with residents and local business owners, homeless service providers, County agencies, and other City governments to discuss the current conditions of homelessness in the City of El Monte. The focus of meetings was to solicit feedback on potential strategies to improve the quality of life for residents, neighborhoods, and the businesses in the City. Part of the planning process encompassed the creation of six (6) goals and supporting actions: 1) Better understand the City’s homeless population and educate the community, 2) Increase engagement activities links to crisis response system, 3) Expand access to workforce development and employment programs, 4) Increase the number of shelter beds, 5) Increase the number of affordable/supportive housing units, and 6) Participate in regional collaboration opportunities.

The City of El Monte has a network of shelters and permanent housing, along with outreach, prevention, and case management services designed to meet to the needs of its homeless population. The City is able to fund this network through the federal HOME Investment Partnership Program (HOME), Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG), and Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG). Through the Emergency Solutions Grant from HUD, the City of El Monte is able work with Volunteers of America to provide rapid rehousing, street outreach, and homelessness prevention activities.

The City of El Monte has a Homelessness Task Force comprised of staff members from the Police Department, Parks, Recreation, and Community Services Department, and Economic Development Department which include the Housing, Planning, and Code Divisions.
City of Lancaster

In August 2018, the City of Lancaster published their proposed “Community Homelessness Plan”. The plan was developed to gain a better understanding of the homeless population in the City, as well as the underlying issues that contribute to homelessness. In October 2017, the City of Lancaster was awarded $70,000 in funding from the County of Los Angeles to develop a community homelessness plan. The City of Lancaster Community Homelessness Plan strives to reduce the impact and decrease the number of persons experiencing homelessness, and ultimately, improve the quality of life for all residents. Through a regional and collaborative approach, the City aims to align their resources with County investments.

The planning process included three (3) phases: 1) develop an understanding of Lancaster, 2) community outreach and participation, and 3) community homelessness plan development and completion. Phase 2 incorporated two online surveys, one community workshop, five focus group meetings, and interviews with stakeholders and individuals from the homeless population. City staff also participated in a ride-along with Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) street team. The City of Lancaster Community Homelessness Plan includes seven (7) goals along with a series of priority needs and supporting actions. The plans goals include prevention, housing, engagement, public safety, data-driven responsiveness, community vitality, and regional collaboration. The City anticipates that the implementation of the Lancaster Community Homelessness Plan will have an estimated first-year cost of $5,121,431, with an ongoing of $3,311,080.

On June 27, 2017, the City of Lancaster adopted an ordinance to create the Lancaster Homeless Impact Commission. Consisting of seven (7) members appointed by the Mayor, the Lancaster Homeless Impact Commission serves to positively impact homelessness in the City through collaborative leadership, research, strategic policy development, and coordinated accountability.

The City of Lancaster, in partnership with InSite Development LLC, The People Concern, and the Community Development Commission of the County of Los Angeles, implemented the development of Kensington Campus: an unconventional, comprehensive housing campus designed to house, employ, and rehabilitate local members of the homeless population. Further, Kensington Campus is a 14-acre development that is architecturally designed to inspire, dignify, and support a genuine transition out of homelessness. The campus concept is centered on permanent supportive housing, interim bridge housing, and a supportive services space. Kensington Campus will include 102 one-bedroom supportive housing units for homeless and chronically homeless individuals, and 156 beds for bridge housing. The completion of Kensington Campus is expected in the fall of 2019.

Part II: Torrance Social Services Commission Activities Related to People Experiencing Homelessness

The Social Services Commission, created and approved by City Council at the meeting of September 22, 2016, was formed to make recommendations to City Council on issues related to veterans affairs, people experiencing homelessness, adults with developmental disabilities and youth with special needs in the
community. Members of the Commission were appointed on January 26, 2016, and the first meeting of the Commission was held on February 25.

During the first nine months of the Commission's appointment, the Commission heard presentations from community organizations, government agencies, and City of Torrance departments to better understand the issues related to, and resources available for, the populations within the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction. Also during their first nine months, the Commission developed a workplan based on information learned from these presentations.

At a joint meeting between the Social Services Commission and City Council on November 22, 2016, the Commission presented Council with its workplan and received concurrence from Council of the order of workplan priorities. In summary, the priorities of the Commission workplan are as follows:

1. **Information, Resources, Outreach & Referrals:** The purpose of this strategy is to develop information sources in a variety of formats that identify organizations serving the Commission's four populations, and how to access these services.

2. **Understanding and Keeping Connected with Our Populations:** The purpose of this strategy is for the Commission to continuously assess its four populations and sub populations, their dynamic needs, and opportunities for the City to support these populations. This strategy also seeks to measure the impact of the City's actions for the Commission's four populations.

3. **Marshalling Community Support & Raising Public Awareness:** The purpose of this strategy is for the Commission to engage the Torrance community with its four populations through awareness and action.

4. **City's Support of Social Services:** The purpose of this strategy is to explore recommendations for the Commission's four populations in order to impact City ordinances, policies, procedures, positions, and services.

5. **Increasing Housing Opportunities:** The purpose of this strategy is to better understand the opportunities for the City to address housing issues related to the Commission's four populations, and recommend action.

6. **Developing Social Opportunities and Inclusion:** The purpose of this strategy is to increase the Commission’s four populations' sense of belonging in the Torrance Community.

**Key Commission Programs and Projects Related to Homelessness**

**Veterans Appreciation Luncheon and Resource Fair**

- **Description:** Since 2017, the Commission has coordinated the annual Veterans Appreciation Luncheon and Resource Fair. The event draws approximately 200 Veterans and their guest, and features a keynote speaker, an appreciation lunch, and a resource fair with governmental agencies and community-based organizations that serve Veterans.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategy One:** A key element of this program is the resource fair, where attendees can be connected agencies that serve Veterans, and provide services such as accessing benefits and preventing homelessness. Agencies who have attended in the past include Department of Veterans Affairs, Disabled American Veterans and CalVet. Feedback from participants consistently
underscores that Veterans often do not know the resources available to them, and that opportunities for face-to-face interaction facilitates their awareness of these resources.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends the City continue this annual event and the event continue to provide resource booths to connect Veterans with relevant services.

**LAHSA Homeless Count**

- **Description:** Since 2018, the Commission has coordinated for the City to be an Opt-In partner for the Greater Los Angeles Homeless Street Count. The Street Count occurs in January of each year, and the City has committed to be an Opt-In partner through 2021 to provide the Deployment Site, Deployment Site Coordinator, and Volunteer Recruitment.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies Two and Three:** Being an Opt-In partner allows the City to obtain specific local data for the Homeless Count. Participating as an Opt-In partner also allows the Torrance community to increase awareness of issues related to homelessness, and to contribute action in a meaningful way.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends that the City continue providing the Deployment Site for future Street Counts, and continue being the Site and Volunteer Recruitment Coordinator for the annual homeless count.

**COT Toiletry Drive**

- **Description:** Since 2018, the Commission has coordinated a citywide toiletry drive for Harbor Interfaith, Family Promise of South Bay, and 1736 Crisis Center. These three agencies were selected because they serve the Torrance community and are designated by LA County as agencies part of the Coordinated Entry System.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies Two and Three:** The toiletry drive allows the City to interface with agencies serving the immediate community, increasing the public’s understanding of the unique needs of the organization and of the populations they serve. The drive also allows the community to contribute action in a meaningful way, and to know that their contributions impact the immediate community.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends that the City continue the annual Toiletry Drive and increase the public’s awareness by having information and resources available (i.e. LA-HOP and the City’s resource card) as well as agency information for people making donations.

**TUSD Back 2 School Drive**

- **Description:** In 2019, the Commission coordinated a school supplies drive for TUSD’s Building Bridges program. The Building Bridges program identifies and works with Homeless and Foster students in the district to remove any barriers to academic participation and success. In the 2018-19 school year, 130 students in TUSD experienced homelessness. An additional 120 students in TUSD were in the foster care system. Supplies collected include pens, pencils, scissors, notebooks, calculators, backpacks, binders, and books, and were distributed at TUSD’s Back 2 School Bash.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies Two and Three:** The supplies drive allows the Commission to understand the needs of students experiencing homelessness and youth in foster care. The drive promotes collaboration between the City and the School District in serving our community. And the
drive allows the community to contribute action in a meaningful way, and increase awareness of the impacts of homelessness to students.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends that the City continue being a coordinating partner for TUSD’s supplies drive.

**Resource Guides**

- **Description:** The Commission has published two key resources. First is a business card size resource list with five resources related to homelessness. 1) LA-Hop.org is an online resource for any member of the public or any City employee to make an outreach request for someone experiencing homelessness. 2) Harbor Interfaith is the lead agency for the Coordinated Entry System, the starting point for anyone experiencing homelessness to be connected with the most appropriate agency. 3) Family Promise of South Bay serves families experiencing homelessness. 4) 1736 Family Crisis Center serves those experiencing domestic violence. 5) Mental Health America serves Veterans experiencing homelessness. Second, the Commission established a webpage on the City’s website that provides information on organizations serving the four populations within their subject matter jurisdiction. Agencies identified are either government agencies or nonprofits that have been designated by a government agency as a service provider.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies One, Three and Four:** The online and physical resource lists are ways in which the community can take direct action in assisting those in the community experiencing homelessness. The Commission has taken great care to align the information provided with LA County’s designated agencies. In addition to providing these resource lists to the community, the resources have been used to help train City employees on how to assist people experiencing homelessness.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends that the City continue working with LA County to identify resources most appropriate for the website and printed material.

**Spotlight on a Nonprofit**

- **Description:** In 2019, the Commission approved a pilot program, where a nonprofit organization serving the Torrance community will be highlighted on a quarterly basis. Elements of the Spotlight on a Nonprofit program include coverage on CitiCABLE, social media announcements, and an introduction of the nonprofit agency at a City Council meeting.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies One and Three:** The proposed Spotlight on a Nonprofit program will increase greater community awareness of resources available to those experiencing homelessness.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends implementing this program in either late 2019 or early 2020 with the first nonprofit being one that serves people experiencing homelessness.

**Learning and Synthesizing Information**

- **Description:** In the three years since the workplan was developed, homelessness has changed significantly. The Social Services Commission staff liaisons and many of the Commissioners have spent time attending lectures, workshops, and public forums about homelessness to gain a higher level and broader understanding of the challenges and strategies. The Commission has come to understand that there are many diverse experiences and perspectives related to people experiencing
homelessness, and the organizations that are designed to provide support to them. Although a variety of financial resources exist to assist people experiencing homelessness in Torrance and throughout Los Angeles County [i.e. Measure H, Department of Health Services (DHS), Veteran’s Affairs (VA), etc.], each source has distinctive processes and priorities, which can be frustrating when trying to design an overall system, or when trying to help any given individual. The Commission has also learned that since the implementation of the workplan, more people in LA County have become homeless each year.

- **Alignment with Workplan Strategies One, Two and Three:** Hearing from providers, attending workshops and lectures, and participating in public forums has allowed the Commission to better understand the broad spectrum of needs of people experiencing homelessness. It has also helped the Commission understand resources available. Perhaps more importantly, these learning events serve as an opportunity for the Commission and City staff to provide feedback about the specific needs of Torrance to the nonprofit and government agencies serving our community.

- **Recommendation of the Commission:** The Commission recommends that the Commission and City staff continue participating in workshops, lectures and public forums, as it is critical to the City learning about our community who faces homelessness. The City’s participation also allows the City’s voice to be heard.

**Part III: City of Torrance Homeless Resources**

**What does Homelessness look like in the City of Torrance?**

Based on results from the 2019 Homeless Count conducted by Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority (LAHSA) the estimated total number of persons experiencing homelessness during the Point in Time (PIT) Count for the City of Torrance was 226 people, 79.6% (180 people) of whom were unsheltered and 20.4% (46) of whom were sheltered. Please note that of those individuals who were sheltered, LAHSA indicates that 32 people were in an “Emergency Shelter” and 14 people were in Transitional Housing.

Locations within the City most adversely affected by people suffering from homelessness:

- Under Madrona Bridge- (Madrona Ave. between Del Amo Blvd & 190th)
- Starbucks- Artesia & Prairie (N/E Corner adjacent the 405)
- Columbia Park- Prairie & 190th
- Starbucks- 21209 Hawthorne Blvd. (Torrance Bl./ Village Lane)
- Torrance/Crenshaw Bus Bench- (S/E Corner)
- Wilson Park- 2200 Crenshaw Blvd., Torrance CA 90501
- Walteria Park- 3855 242nd St.
- El Retiro Park- 126 Vista del Parque
- Torrance Beach- 387 Paseo De La Playa
- Hawthorne Blvd business corridor
Torrance Homelessness, per Homeless Count

Key Take-Aways
- Unsheltered homelessness rose: 2% since 2018, 128% since 2015
- People living in vehicles rose: 13% since 2018, 309% since 2015
- Mirrors South Bay “living situation” trends

Torrance Vehicular Homelessness

Affordable Housing Options in Torrance
California Redevelopment law provided funding for affordable housing in Torrance, including:
- Coleman Court – 79 unit low-income senior apartment complex (ages 62+)
- Ocean Terrace – 36 unit low-income senior apartment complex (ages 62+)
- El Prado Apartments
• Cabrillo Family Apartments

Projects developed by use of federal subsidies or tax credit financing in Torrance include:

• Golden West Towers – HUD project based financing. 179 unit low-income senior apartment complex (ages 62+)
• JCI Gardens – HUD project based financing. 101 unit low-income senior apartment complex (ages 62+)
• Harmony Courts – Tax credit financing. 187 unit low-income senior apartment complex (ages 62+)

What is the City doing to address the homeless crisis?

Police Department

Local Resources

The City of Torrance is located in Service Provider Area (SPA) 8 of Los Angeles County, and we have local resources available to assist our residents in their greatest times of need. While there are many service providers in our area, we promote a focused “Coordinated Entry System” or CES, to help file everyone through the same starting point, so that professionals can link those in need to the appropriate service providers and resources.

On the Torrance Police Department (TPD) Website, there is a page dedicated to Homeless Resources, which provides information on the following service providers:

• Harbor Interfaith Services – Adults and Youth (CES contact)
• Family Promise of the South Bay – Families
• MHA Operation Healthy Homecoming – Veterans
• 1736 Family Crisis Center – Victims of domestic violence, runaway/homeless youth, homeless families, at-risk veterans, low-income/unemployed residents in need

TPD works closely with Harbor Interfaith Services through LA-HOP and regularly direct emails to the SPA 8 Outreach Coordinator.

Source: https://www.torranceca.gov/government/police/resources/homeless-outreach

South Bay Cities Council of Governments/PATH

SBCCOG is working with PATH to help the homeless in the South Bay. PATH provides outreach services throughout the South Bay cities, including Torrance, targeting areas identified as homeless “hot spots” and engaging with those living in them. PATH provides assistance to individuals and families. Their services include:

• Housing Assistance
• Interim Housing
• Veteran Services
• Mental Health Care
Community Lead Officers

“Community Lead Officers”, or CLOs, are tasked with addressing quality of life issues that often times cannot be properly addressed by regular Patrol Officers due to time and resource requirements. These quality of life issues commonly include issues including environmental concerns with residential homes (i.e. unkempt, cars parked on the lawn, homelessness, large amounts of debris, etc.) and neighborhood dispute issues.

CLO’s conduct monthly Homeless Outreach Operations respond to areas where homeless subjects seek shelter, have generated calls for service, or are simply observed. CLOs approach the homeless in a non-confrontational manner, provide service information, and introduce them to LAHSA personnel so they can obtain the resources specific to their needs.

CLOs play an instrumental role in connecting homeless individuals with resources. The CLOs also assist with encampment clean-up and responding to citizen concerns related to homelessness.

The On-Going Strategy of the CLOs includes efforts such as:

- CLO’s train uniformed personnel and provide them with distribution material with homeless services
- Educate the public and provide formalized training to City Personnel (i.e. Library Staff, Parks & Recreation) who are often in contact with this population
- Assist in taking an interdepartmental approach to address quality of life issues, and work with the City Attorney’s Office on an as-needed basis for escalated issues.
- Attend Chamber of Commerce meetings to communicate proactively with local business owners who have concerns and are willing to contribute to our mission
- Collaborate with non-profit, faith based, and government services
- Obtain support from County Mental Health (TMET) and local hospitals
- Maintain communication with other agencies for best practices

Sources: https://www.torranceca.gov/government/police/community-affairs/community-lead-officers, Presentation to the Social Services Commission 3-24-16

Torrance Mental Evaluation Team

The Torrance Mental Evaluation Team (TMET) was established in early 2015 and consists of a highly trained Torrance Police Officer and a Department of Mental Health (DMH) clinician. The mission of the Torrance Police Department and the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health is to provide effective, collaborative, and compassionate mental health and law enforcement co-response to those in
need of mental health services, who are experiencing suspected symptoms of mental illness. One of TMET’s responsibilities is to assist the CLOs with Homeless Outreach.

City Manager’s Office

Homeless Resource Card

Staff Training – LA-HOP (Library, Transit, Park Services...)

Library

Community Outreach: Veteran’s Resources online, including Housing, Homeless Vets Hotline, etc.

Source: https://www.library.torranceca.gov/resources/veterans-resources

Community Development

Housing Assistance Office

The Community Development Department’s Housing Assistance Office oversees the Section 8 rental Assistance Program (federally-funded), which enables income eligible families; senior citizens; and disabled and handicapped persons to reside in privately-owned, decent, safe and sanitary housing.

- Torrance has 690 vouchers.
- 589 vouchers currently in use, which equates to 103% of our funding from HUD.
- 20-30 units turn over yearly (i.e. move-outs, deaths).
- 2/3 vouchers used by senior or disabled households.
- Based on limited federal funding, there are 15k people on the waiting list to get one of the 690 vouchers that qualify.
- Staff inspects units regularly to ensure decent, safe, and sanitary housing is maintained.

Fire Department

The Torrance Fire Department assists with encampment clean-ups, hazardous waste/material disposal, and addressing other quality of life issues related to homelessness. The Community Risk Reduction Division applies life safety codes to new and existing structures, performs fire investigation and oversees hazardous material administration. The goal is to move from a personality driven division to policy based operation. The second goal is to be aware of incidents in other jurisdictions and to consider their relevance in reducing risk in our community.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT MARTIN; LAWRENCE LEE SMITH; ROBERT ANDERSON; JANET F. BELL; PAMELA S. HAWKES; and BASIL E. HUMPHREY, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF BOISE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-35845
D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00540-REB

ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Ronald E. Bush, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 13, 2017
Portland, Oregon

Filed April 1, 2019

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Paul J. Watford,
and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Order;
Concurrence in Order by Judge Berzon;
Dissent to Order by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;
Dissent to Order by Judge Bennett;
Opinion by Judge Berzon;
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Owens
SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel amended its opinion filed September 4, 2018, and reported at 902 F.3d 1031, denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court, and ordered that no further petitions shall be entertained.

In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Boise in an action brought by six current or formerly homeless City of Boise residents who alleged that their citations under the City’s Camping and Disorderly Conduct Ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

Plaintiffs sought damages for the alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Two plaintiffs also sought prospective declaratory and injunctive relief precluding future enforcement of the ordinances. In 2014, after this litigation began, the ordinances were amended to prohibit their enforcement against any homeless person on public property on any night when no shelter had an available overnight space.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
The panel first held that two plaintiffs had standing to pursue prospective relief because they demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they faced a credible risk of prosecution on a night when they had been denied access to the City’s shelters. The panel noted that although the 2014 amendment precluded the City from enforcing the ordinances when shelters were full, individuals could still be turned away for reasons other than shelter capacity, such as for exceeding the shelter’s stay limits, or for failing to take part in a shelter’s mandatory religious programs.

The panel held that although the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and its progeny precluded most — but not all — of the plaintiffs’ requests for retrospective relief, the doctrine had no application to plaintiffs’ request for an injunction enjoining prospective enforcement of the ordinances.

Turning to the merits, the panel held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment precluded the enforcement of a statute prohibiting sleeping outside against homeless individuals with no access to alternative shelter. The panel held that, as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they had a choice in the matter.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Owens disagreed with the majority’s opinion that Heck v. Humphrey did not bar plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge Owens stated that a declaration that the city ordinances are unconstitutional and an injunction against their future enforcement would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of plaintiffs’ prior convictions. Judge Owens otherwise joined the majority in full.

Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Berzon stated that on the merits, the panel’s opinion was limited and held only that municipal ordinances that criminalize sleeping, sitting, or lying in all public spaces, when no alternative sleeping space is available, violate the Eighth Amendment. Judge Berzon further stated that a photograph featured in Judge M. Smith’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, depicting tents on a Los Angeles public sidewalk, was not part of the record, was unrelated, predated the panel’s decision and did not serve to illustrate a concrete effect of the panel’s holding. Judge Berzon stated that what the pre-Martin photograph did demonstrate was that the ordinances criminalizing sleeping in public places were never a viable solution to the homelessness problem.

Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge M. Smith, joined by Judges Callahan, Bea, Ikuta, Bennett and R. Nelson, stated that the panel severely misconstrued three areas of binding Supreme Court precedent, and that the panel’s opinion created several splits with other appellate courts. Judge M. Smith further stated that the panel’s holding has already begun wreaking havoc on local governments, residents, and businesses throughout the circuit. Judge M. Smith stated that the panel’s reasoning will soon prevent local governments from enforcing a host of other public health and safety laws, such as those prohibiting public defecation and urination, and that the panel’s opinion shackles the hands of public officials trying to redress the serious societal concern of homelessness.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Bennett, joined by Judges Bea, Ikuta, R. Nelson, and joined by Judge M. Smith as to Part II, stated that the panel’s decision, which allows pre-conviction Eighth Amendment challenges, is wholly inconsistent with the text and tradition of the Eighth Amendment.

COUNSEL


Brady J. Hall (argued), Michael W. Moore, and Steven R. Kraft, Moore Elia Kraft & Hall LLP, Boise, Idaho; Scott B. Muir, Deputy City Attorney; Robert B. Luce, City Attorney; City Attorney’s Office, Boise, Idaho; for Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER

The Opinion filed September 4, 2018, and reported at 902 F.3d 1031, is hereby amended. The amended opinion will be filed concurrently with this order.

The panel has unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing. The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. The matter failed to receive a majority of votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED.

Future petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc will not be entertained in this case.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc:

I strongly disfavor this circuit’s innovation in en banc procedure—ubiquitous dissents in the denial of rehearing en banc, sometimes accompanied by concurrences in the denial of rehearing en banc. As I have previously explained, dissents in the denial of rehearing en banc, in particular, often engage in a “distorted presentation of the issues in the case, creating the impression of rampant error in the original panel opinion although a majority—often a decisive majority—of the active members of the court . . . perceived no error.” Defs. of Wildlife Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 450 F.3d 394, 402 (9th Cir. 2006) (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc); see also Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, "Dissentals," and Decision Making, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1479 (2012). Often times, the dramatic tone of these dissents leads them to read more like petitions for writ of certiorari on steroids, rather than reasoned judicial opinions.

Despite my distaste for these separate writings, I have, on occasion, written concurrences in the denial of rehearing en banc. On those rare occasions, I have addressed arguments raised for the first time during the en banc process, corrected misrepresentations, or highlighted important facets of the case that had yet to be discussed.

This case serves as one of the few occasions in which I feel compelled to write a brief concurrence. I will not address the dissents’ challenges to the Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and Eighth Amendment rulings of Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), as the opinion sufficiently rebuts those erroneous arguments. I write only to raise two points.

First, the City of Boise did not initially seek en banc reconsideration of the Eighth Amendment holding. When this court solicited the parties’ positions as to whether the Eighth Amendment holding merits en banc review, the City’s initial submission, before mildly supporting en banc reconsideration, was that the opinion is quite “narrow” and its “interpretation of the [C]onstitution raises little actual conflict with Boise’s Ordinances or [their] enforcement.” And the City noted that it viewed prosecution of homeless individuals for sleeping outside as a “last resort,” not as a principal weapon in reducing homelessness and its impact on the City.
The City is quite right about the limited nature of the opinion. On the merits, the opinion holds only that municipal ordinances that criminalize sleeping, sitting, or lying in all public spaces, when no alternative sleeping space is available, violate the Eighth Amendment. Martin, 902 F.3d at 1035. Nothing in the opinion reaches beyond criminalizing the biologically essential need to sleep when there is no available shelter.

Second, Judge M. Smith’s dissent features an unattributed color photograph of “a Los Angeles public sidewalk.” The photograph depicts several tents lining a street and is presumably designed to demonstrate the purported negative impact of Martin. But the photograph fails to fulfill its intended purpose for several reasons.

For starters, the picture is not in the record of this case and is thus inappropriately included in the dissent. It is not the practice of this circuit to include outside-the-record photographs in judicial opinions, especially when such photographs are entirely unrelated to the case. And in this instance, the photograph is entirely unrelated. It depicts a sidewalk in Los Angeles, not a location in the City of Boise, the actual municipality at issue. Nor can the photograph be said to illuminate the impact of Martin within this circuit, as it predates our decision and was likely taken in 2017.1

1 Although Judge M. Smith does not credit the photograph to any source, an internet search suggests that the original photograph is attributable to Los Angeles County. See Implementing the Los Angeles County Homelessness Initiative, L.A. County, http://homeless.lacounty.gov/implementing-the-los-angeles-county-homeless-initiative/ [https://
But even putting aside the use of a pre-Martin, outside-the-record photograph from another municipality, the photograph does not serve to illustrate a concrete effect of Martin's holding. The opinion clearly states that it is not outlawing ordinances "barring the obstruction of public rights of way or the erection of certain structures," such as tents, id. at 1048 n.8, and that the holding "in no way dictate[s] to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any time and at any place," id. at 1048 (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006)).

What the pre-Martin photograph does demonstrate is that the ordinances criminalizing sleeping in public places were never a viable solution to the homelessness problem. People with no place to live will sleep outside if they have no alternative. Taking them to jail for a few days is both unconstitutional, for the reasons discussed in the opinion, and, in all likelihood, pointless.

The distressing homelessness problem—distressing to the people with nowhere to live as well as to the rest of society—has grown into a crisis for many reasons, among them the cost of housing, the drying up of affordable care for people with mental illness, and the failure to provide adequate treatment for drug addiction. See, e.g., U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, Homelessness in America: Focus on Individual Adults 5–8 (2018), https://www.usich.gov/resources/?uploads/asset_library/HIA_Individual_Adults.pdf.
The crisis continued to burgeon while ordinances forbidding sleeping in public were on the books and sometimes enforced. There is no reason to believe that it has grown, and is likely to grow larger, because Martin held it unconstitutional to criminalize simply sleeping somewhere in public if one has nowhere else to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the denial of rehearing en banc.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom CALLAHAN, BEA, IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

In one misguided ruling, a three-judge panel of our court badly misconstrued not one or two, but three areas of binding Supreme Court precedent, and crafted a holding that has begun wreaking havoc on local governments, residents, and businesses throughout our circuit. Under the panel’s decision, local governments are forbidden from enforcing laws restricting public sleeping and camping unless they provide shelter for every homeless individual within their jurisdictions. Moreover, the panel’s reasoning will soon prevent local governments from enforcing a host of other public health and safety laws, such as those prohibiting public defecation and urination. Perhaps most unfortunately, the panel’s opinion shackles the hands of public officials trying to redress the serious societal concern of homelessness.¹

¹ With almost 553,000 people who experienced homelessness nationwide on a single night in January 2018, this issue affects communities across our country. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
I respectfully dissent from our court’s refusal to correct this holding by rehearing the case en banc.

I.

The most harmful aspect of the panel’s opinion is its misreading of Eighth Amendment precedent. My colleagues cobble together disparate portions of a fragmented Supreme Court opinion to hold that “an ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public property, when no alternative shelter is available to them.” Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). That holding is legally and practically ill-conceived, and conflicts with the reasoning of every other appellate court that has considered the issue.

A.

The panel struggles to paint its holding as a faithful interpretation of the Supreme Court’s fragmented opinion in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). It fails.

To understand Powell, we must begin with the Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). There, the Court addressed a statute that made it a “criminal


2 Our court previously adopted the same Eighth Amendment holding as the panel in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), but that decision was later vacated. 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).
offense for a person to ‘be addicted to the use of narcotics.’” Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660 (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721). The statute allowed defendants to be convicted so long as they were drug addicts, regardless of whether they actually used or possessed drugs. Id. at 665. The Court struck down the statute under the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that because “narcotic addiction is an illness . . . which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily . . . a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug” violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 667.

A few years later, in Powell, the Court addressed the scope of its holding in Robinson. Powell concerned the constitutionality of a Texas law that criminalized public drunkenness. Powell, 392 U.S. at 516. As the panel’s opinion acknowledges, there was no majority in Powell. The four Justices in the plurality interpreted the decision in Robinson as standing for the limited proposition that the government could not criminalize one’s status. Id. at 534. They held that because the Texas statute criminalized conduct rather than alcoholism, the law was constitutional. Powell, 392 U.S. at 532.

The four dissenting Justices in Powell read Robinson more broadly: They believed that “criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.” Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Although the statute in Powell differed from that in Robinson by covering involuntary conduct, the dissent found the same constitutional defect present in both cases. Id. at 567–68.

Justice White concurred in the judgment. He upheld the defendant’s conviction because Powell had not made a
showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night he was arrested. *Id.* at 552–53 (White, J., concurring in the result). He wrote that it was “unnecessary to pursue at this point the further definition of the circumstances or the state of intoxication which might bar conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in a public place.” *Id.* at 553.

The panel contends that because Justice White concurred in the judgment alone, the views of the dissenting Justices constitute the holding of *Powell*. *Martin*, 902 F.3d at 1048. That tenuous reasoning—which metamorphosizes the *Powell* dissent into the majority opinion—defies logic.

Because *Powell* was a 4–1–4 decision, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Marks v. United States* guides our analysis. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). There, the Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” *Id.* at 193 (quoting *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). When *Marks* is applied to *Powell*, the holding is clear: The defendant’s conviction was constitutional because it involved the commission of an act. Nothing more, nothing less.

This is hardly a radical proposition. I am not alone in recognizing that “there is definitely no Supreme Court holding” prohibiting the criminalization of involuntary conduct. *United States v. Moore*, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). Indeed, in the years since *Powell* was decided, courts—including our own—have routinely upheld state laws that criminalized acts that were allegedly
compelled or involuntary. See, e.g., United States v. Stenson, 475 F. App’x 630, 631 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that it was constitutional for the defendant to be punished for violating the terms of his parole by consuming alcohol because he “was not punished for his status as an alcoholic but for his conduct”); Joshua v. Adams, 231 F. App’x 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Joshua also contends that the state court ignored his mental illness [schizophrenia], which rendered him unable to control his behavior, and his sentence was actually a penalty for his illness . . . . This contention is without merit because, in contrast to Robinson, where a statute specifically criminalized addiction, Joshua was convicted of a criminal offense separate and distinct from his ‘status’ as a schizophrenic.”); United States v. Benefield, 889 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The considerations that make any incarceration unconstitutional when a statute punishes a defendant for his status are not applicable when the government seeks to punish a person’s actions.”).

To be sure, Marks is controversial. Last term, the Court agreed to consider whether to abandon the rule Marks established (but ultimately resolved the case on other grounds and found it “unnecessary to consider . . . . the proper application of Marks”). Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). At oral argument, the Justices criticized the logical subset rule established by Marks for elevating the outlier views of concurring Justices to precedential status.4

3 That most of these opinions were unpublished only buttresses my point: It is uncontroversial that Powell does not prohibit the criminalization of involuntary conduct.

The Court also acknowledged that lower courts have inconsistently interpreted the holdings of fractured decisions under *Marks*.

Those criticisms, however, were based on the assumption that *Marks* means what it says and says what it means: Only the views of the Justices concurring in the judgment may be considered in construing the Court’s holding. *Marks*, 430 U.S. at 193. The Justices did not even think to consider that *Marks* allows dissenting Justices to create the Court’s holding. As a *Marks* scholar has observed, such a method of vote counting “would paradoxically create a precedent that contradicted the judgment in that very case.” And yet the panel’s opinion flouts that common sense rule to extract from *Powell* a holding that does not exist.

What the panel really does is engage in a predictive model of precedent. The panel opinion implies that if a case like *Powell* were to arise again, a majority of the Court would hold that the criminalization of involuntary conduct violates the Eighth Amendment. Utilizing such reasoning, the panel borrows the Justices’ robes and adopts that holding on their behalf.

But the Court has repeatedly discouraged us from making such predictions when construing precedent. *See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.*, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). And, for good reason. Predictions about how

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5 *Id.* at 49.

Justices will rule rest on unwarranted speculation about what goes on in their minds. Such amateur fortunetelling also precludes us from considering new insights on the issues—difficult as they may be in the case of 4–1–4 decisions like *Powell*—that have arisen since the Court’s fragmented opinion. See *E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train*, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977) (noting “the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals”).

In short, predictions about how the Justices will rule ought not to create precedent. The panel’s Eighth Amendment holding lacks any support in *Robinson* or *Powell*.

**B.**

Our panel’s opinion also conflicts with the reasoning underlying the decisions of other appellate courts.

The California Supreme Court, in *Tobe v. City of Santa Ana*, rejected the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment challenge to a city ordinance that banned public camping. 892 P.2d 1145 (1995). The court reached that conclusion despite evidence that, on any given night, at least 2,500 homeless persons in the city did not have shelter beds available to them. *Id.* at 1152. The court sensibly reasoned that because *Powell* was a fragmented opinion, it did not create precedent on “the question of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, ‘involuntary’ or ‘occasioned by a compulsion.’” *Id.* at 1166 (quoting *Powell*, 392 U.S. at 533). Our panel—bound by the same Supreme Court precedent—invalidates identical California ordinances
previously upheld by the California Supreme Court. Both courts cannot be correct.

The California Supreme Court acknowledged that homelessness is a serious societal problem. It explained, however, that:

Many of those issues are the result of legislative policy decisions. The arguments of many amici curiae regarding the apparently intractable problem of homelessness and the impact of the Santa Ana ordinance on various groups of homeless persons (e.g., teenagers, families with children, and the mentally ill) should be addressed to the Legislature and the Orange County Board of Supervisors, not the judiciary. Neither the criminal justice system nor the judiciary is equipped to resolve chronic social problems, but criminalizing conduct that is a product of those problems is not for that reason constitutionally impermissible.

_Id._ at 1157 n.12. By creating new constitutional rights out of whole cloth, my well-meaning, but unelected, colleagues improperly inject themselves into the role of public policymaking.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Justice Black has also observed that solutions for challenging social issues should be left to the policymakers:

I cannot say that the States should be totally barred from one avenue of experimentation, the criminal process, in attempting to find a means to cope with this difficult social problem . . . . [I]t seems to me that the
The reasoning of our panel decision also conflicts with precedents of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. In *Manning v. Caldwell*, the Fourth Circuit held that a Virginia statute that criminalized the possession of alcohol did not violate the Eighth Amendment when it punished the involuntary actions of homeless alcoholics. 900 F.3d 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2018), *reh’g en banc granted* 741 F. App’x 937 (4th Cir. 2018). The court rejected the argument that Justice White’s opinion in *Powell* “requires this court to hold that Virginia’s statutory scheme imposes cruel and unusual punishment because it criminalizes [plaintiffs’] status as homeless alcoholics.” *Id.* at 145. The court found that the statute passed constitutional muster because “it is the act of possessing alcohol—not the status of being an alcoholic—that gives rise to criminal sanctions.” *Id.* at 147.

Boise’s Ordinances at issue in this case are no different: They do not criminalize the status of homelessness, but only the act of camping on public land or occupying public places without permission. *Martin*, 902 F.3d at 1035. The Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that these kinds of laws do not run afoul of *Robinson* and *Powell*.

_present use of criminal sanctions might possibly be unwise, but I am by no means convinced that any use of criminal sanctions would inevitably be unwise or, above all, that I am qualified in this area to know what is legislatively wise and what is legislatively unwise.

*Powell*, 392 U.S. at 539–40 (Black, J., concurring).

8 Pursuant to Fourth Circuit Local Rule 35(c), “[g]ranting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and opinion.” I mention *Manning*, however, as an illustration of other courts’ reasoning on the Eighth Amendment issue.
The Eleventh Circuit has agreed. In Joel v. City of Orlando, the court held that a city ordinance prohibiting sleeping on public property was constitutional. 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000). The court rejected the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment challenge because the ordinance “targets conduct, and does not provide criminal punishment based on a person’s status.” Id. The court prudently concluded that “[t]he City is constitutionally allowed to regulate where ‘camping’ occurs.” Id.

We ought to have adopted the sound reasoning of these other courts. By holding that Boise’s enforcement of its Ordinances violates the Eighth Amendment, our panel has needlessly created a split in authority on this straightforward issue.

C.

One would think our panel’s legally incorrect decision would at least foster the common good. Nothing could be further from the truth. The panel’s decision generates dire practical consequences for the hundreds of local governments within our jurisdiction, and for the millions of people that reside therein.

The panel opinion masquerades its decision as a narrow one by representing that it “in no way dictate[s] to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any time and at any place.” Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006)).
That excerpt, however, glosses over the decision's actual holding: "We hold only that . . . as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property." *Id.* Such a holding leaves cities with a Hobson's choice: They must either undertake an overwhelming financial responsibility to provide housing for or count the number of homeless individuals within their jurisdiction every night, or abandon enforcement of a host of laws regulating public health and safety. The Constitution has no such requirement.

* * *

Under the panel's decision, local governments can enforce certain of their public health and safety laws only when homeless individuals have the choice to sleep indoors. That inevitably leads to the question of how local officials ought to know whether that option exists.

The number of homeless individuals within a municipality on any given night is not automatically reported and updated in real time. Instead, volunteers or government employees must painstakingly tally the number of homeless individuals block by block, alley by alley, doorway by doorway. Given the daily fluctuations in the homeless population, the panel's opinion would require this labor-intensive task be done every single day. Yet in massive cities such as Los Angeles, that is simply impossible. Even when thousands of volunteers devote dozens of hours to such "a herculean task," it takes three days to finish counting—and
even then “not everybody really gets counted.” Lest one think Los Angeles is unique, our circuit is home to many of the largest homeless populations nationwide.

If cities do manage to cobble together the resources for such a system, what happens if officials (much less volunteers) miss a homeless individual during their daily count and police issue citations under the false impression that the number of shelter beds exceeds the number of homeless people that night? According to the panel’s opinion, that city has violated the Eighth Amendment, thereby potentially leading to lawsuits for significant monetary damages and other relief.

9 Matt Tinoco, LA Counts Its Homeless, But Counting Everybody Is Virtually Impossible, LAist (Jan. 22, 2019, 2:08 PM), https://laist.com/2019/01/22/los_angeles_homeless_count_2019_how_volunteer.php. The panel conceded the imprecision of such counts in its opinion. See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1036 n.1 (acknowledging that the count of homeless individuals “is not always precise”). But it went on to disregard that fact when tying a city’s ability to enforce its laws to these counts.

10 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 2018 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress reveals that municipalities within our circuit have among the highest homeless populations in the country. In Los Angeles City and County alone, 49,955 people experienced homelessness in 2018. The number was 12,112 people in Seattle and King County, Washington, and 8,576 people in San Diego City and County, California. See supra note 1, at 18, 20. In 2016, Las Vegas had an estimated homeless population of 7,509 individuals, and California’s Santa Clara County had 6,556. Joaquin Palomino, How Many People Live On Our Streets?, S.F. Chronicle (June 28, 2016), https://projects.sfchronicle.com/sf-homeless/numbers.
And what if local governments (understandably) lack the resources necessary for such a monumental task? They have no choice but to stop enforcing laws that prohibit public sleeping and camping. Accordingly, our panel’s decision

11 Cities can instead provide sufficient housing for every homeless individual, but the cost would be prohibitively expensive for most local governments. Los Angeles, for example, would need to spend $403.4 million to house every homeless individual not living in a vehicle. See Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, Report on Emergency Framework to Homelessness Plan 13 (June 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4550980/LAHSA-Sheltering-Report.pdf. In San Francisco, building new centers to provide a mere 400 additional shelter spaces was estimated to cost between $10 million and $20 million, and would require $20 million to $30 million to operate each year. See Heather Knight, A Better Model, A Better Result?, S.F. Chronicle (June 29, 2016), https://projects.sfchronicle.com/sf-homeless/shelters. Perhaps these staggering sums are why the panel went out of its way to state that it “in no way dictate[s] to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless.” Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048.

12 Indeed, in the few short months since the panel’s decision, several cities have thrown up their hands and abandoned any attempt to enforce such laws. See, e.g., Cynthia Hubert, Sacramento County Cleared Homeless Camps All Year. Now It Has Stopped Citing Campers, Sacramento Bee (Sept. 18, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/homeless/article218605025.html (“Sacramento County park rangers have suddenly stopped issuing citations altogether after a federal court ruling this month.”); Michael Ellis Langley, Policing Homelessness, Golden State Newspapers (Feb. 22, 2019), http://www.goldenstatenewspapers.com/tracy_press/news/policing-homelessness/article_5f6a9ca3-3642-11e9-9b25-37610ef2dbae.html (Sheriff Pat Withrow stating that, “[a]s far as camping ordinances and things like that, we’re probably holding off on [issuing citations] for a while” in light of Martin v. City of Boise); Kelsie Morgan, Moses Lake Sees Spike in Homeless Activity Following 9th Circuit Court Decision, KXLY (Oct. 2, 2018, 12:50 PM), https://www.kxly.com/news/moses-lake-sees-spike-in-homeless-activity-following-9th-circuit-court-decision/801772571 (“Because the City of Moses Lake does not currently have a homeless shelter, city officials can
effectively allows homeless individuals to sleep and live wherever they wish on most public property. Without an absolute confidence that they can house every homeless individual, city officials will be powerless to assist residents lodging valid complaints about the health and safety of their neighborhoods.¹³

As if the panel’s actual holding wasn’t concerning enough, the logic of the panel’s opinion reaches even further in scope. The opinion reasons that because “resisting the need to . . . engage in [] life-sustaining activities is impossible,” punishing the homeless for engaging in those actions in public violates the Eighth Amendment. *Martin*, 902 F.3d at 1048. What else is a life-sustaining activity? Surely bodily functions. By holding that the Eighth Amendment proscribes the criminalization of involuntary conduct, the panel’s decision will inevitably result in the

striking down of laws that prohibit public defecation and urination. The panel’s reasoning also casts doubt on public safety laws restricting drug paraphernalia, for the use of hypodermic needles and the like is no less involuntary for the homeless suffering from the scourge of addiction than is their sleeping in public.

It is a timeless adage that states have a “universally acknowledged power and duty to enact and enforce all such laws . . . as may rightly be deemed necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals, comfort and welfare of its people.” *Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison*, 183 U.S. 13, 20 (1901) (internal quotations omitted). I fear that the panel’s decision will prohibit local governments from fulfilling their duty to enforce an array of public health and safety laws. Halting enforcement of such laws will potentially wreak havoc on our communities. As we have already begun to witness, our neighborhoods will soon feature “[t]ents . . .

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equipped with mini refrigerators, cupboards, televisions, and heaters, [that] vie with pedestrian traffic” and “human waste appearing on sidewalks and at local playgrounds.”

A Los Angeles Public Sidewalk

II.

The panel’s fanciful merits-determination is accompanied by a no-less-inventive series of procedural rulings. The panel’s opinion also misconstrues two other areas of Supreme Court precedent concerning limits on the parties who can

bring § 1983 challenges for violations of the Eighth Amendment.

A.


The Supreme Court has stated that *Heck* bars § 1983 claims if success on that claim would “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] confinement or its duration.” *Wilkinson v. Dotson*, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005); *see also Edwards v. Balisok*, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (stating that *Heck* applies to claims for declaratory relief). Martin and Anderson’s prospective claims did just that. Those plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Ordinances under which they were convicted are unconstitutional and an injunction against their future enforcement on the grounds of unconstitutionality. It is clear that *Heck* bars these claims because Martin and Anderson necessarily seek to demonstrate the invalidity of their previous convictions.

The panel opinion relies on *Edwards* to argue that *Heck* does not bar plaintiffs’ requested relief, but *Edwards* cannot bear the weight the panel puts on it. In *Edwards*, the plaintiff sought an injunction that would require prison officials to date-stamp witness statements at the time received. 520 U.S. at 643. The Court concluded that requiring prison officials to date-stamp witness statements did not necessarily imply the invalidity of previous determinations that the prisoner was
not entitled to good-time credits, and that *Heck*, therefore, did not bar prospective injunctive relief. *Id.* at 648.

Here, in contrast, a declaration that the Ordinances are unconstitutional and an injunction against their future enforcement necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the plaintiffs’ prior convictions. According to data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the number of homeless individuals in Boise exceeded the number of available shelter beds during each of the years that the plaintiffs were cited.17 Under the panel’s holding that “the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property” “as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors,” that data necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the plaintiffs’ prior convictions. *Martin*, 902 F.3d at 1048.

B.

The panel also erred in holding that Robert Martin and Pamela Hawkes, who were cited but not convicted of violating the Ordinances, had standing to sue under the Eighth Amendment. In so doing, the panel created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit.

The panel relied on *Ingraham v. Wright*, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), to find that a plaintiff “need demonstrate only the

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initiation of the criminal process against him, not a conviction,” to bring an Eighth Amendment challenge. *Martin*, 902 F.3d at 1045. The panel cites *Ingraham*’s observation that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes the criminal process in that “it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.” *Id.* at 1046 (citing *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 667). This reading of *Ingraham*, however, cherry picks isolated statements from the decision without considering them in their accurate context. The *Ingraham* Court plainly held that “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” 430 U.S. at 671 n.40. And, “the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt.” *Id.* (emphasis added). As the *Ingraham* Court recognized, “[T]he decisions of [the Supreme] Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.” *Id.* at 664 (emphasis added). Clearly, then, *Ingraham* stands for the proposition that to challenge a criminal statute as violative of the Eighth Amendment, the individual must be convicted of that relevant crime.

The Fifth Circuit recognized this limitation on standing in *Johnson v. City of Dallas*, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995). There, the court confronted a similar action brought by homeless individuals challenging a sleeping in public ordinance. *Johnson*, 61 F.3d at 443. The court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the ordinance because although “numerous tickets ha[d] been issued . . . [there was] no indication that any Appellees ha[d] been convicted” of
violating the sleeping in public ordinance. *Id.* at 445. The Fifth Circuit explained that *Ingraham* clearly required a plaintiff be convicted under a criminal statute before challenging that statute’s validity. *Id.* at 444–45 (citing *Robinson*, 370 U.S. at 663; *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 667).

By permitting Martin and Hawkes to maintain their Eighth Amendment challenge, the panel’s decision created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit and took our circuit far afield from “[t]he primary purpose of (the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) . . . [which is] the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes.” *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 667 (quoting *Powell*, 392 U.S. at 531–32).

III.

None of us is blind to the undeniable suffering that the homeless endure, and I understand the panel’s impulse to help such a vulnerable population. But the Eighth Amendment is not a vehicle through which to critique public policy choices or to hamstring a local government’s enforcement of its criminal code. The panel’s decision, which effectively strikes down the anti-camping and anti-sleeping Ordinances of Boise and that of countless, if not all, cities within our jurisdiction, has no legitimate basis in current law.

I am deeply concerned about the consequences of our panel’s unfortunate opinion, and I regret that we did not vote to reconsider this case en banc. I respectfully dissent.
I fully join Judge M. Smith’s opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc. I write separately to explain that except in extraordinary circumstances not present in this case, and based on its text, tradition, and original public meaning, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not impose substantive limits on what conduct a state may criminalize.

I recognize that we are, of course, bound by Supreme Court precedent holding that the Eighth Amendment encompasses a limitation “on what can be made criminal and punished as such.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). However, the Ingraham Court specifically “recognized [this] limitation as one to be applied sparingly.” Id. As Judge M. Smith’s dissent ably points out, the panel ignored Ingraham’s clear direction that Eighth Amendment scrutiny attaches only after a criminal conviction. Because the panel’s decision, which allows pre-conviction Eighth Amendment challenges, is wholly inconsistent with the text and tradition of the Eighth Amendment, I respectfully dissent from our decision not to rehear this case en banc.

I.

The text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is virtually identical to Section 10 of the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689,¹ and there is no question that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment were influenced by the prevailing interpretation of Section 10. See *Solem v. Helm*, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) (observing that one of the themes of the founding era “was that Americans had all the rights of English subjects” and the Framers’ “use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same protection”); *Timbs v. Indiana*, 586 U.S. ____ (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he text of the Eighth Amendment was ‘based directly on . . . the Virginia Declaration of Rights,’ which ‘adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights.’” (quoting *Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.*, 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989)). Thus, “not only is the original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the circumstances of its enactment, insofar as they display the particular ‘rights of English subjects’ it was designed to vindicate.” *Harmelin v. Michigan*, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

Justice Scalia’s concurrence in *Harmelin* provides a thorough and well-researched discussion of the original public meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, including a detailed overview of the history of Section 10 of the English Declaration of Rights. See id. at 966–85 (Scalia, J., concurring). Rather than reciting Justice Scalia’s *Harmelin* discussion in its entirety, I provide only a broad description of its historical analysis. Although the issue Justice Scalia confronted in *Harmelin* was whether the

¹ 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441 (1689) (Section 10 of the English Declaration of Rights) (“excessive Baile ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”).
Framers intended to graft a proportionality requirement on the Eighth Amendment, see id. at 976, his opinion’s historical exposition is instructive to the issue of what the Eighth Amendment meant when it was written.

The English Declaration of Rights’s prohibition on “cruell and unusuall Punishments” is attributed to the arbitrary punishments imposed by the King’s Bench following the Monmouth Rebellion in the late 17th century. Id. at 967 (Scalia, J., concurring). “Historians have viewed the English provision as a reaction either to the ‘Bloody Assize,’ the treason trials conducted by Chief Justice Jeffreys in 1685 after the abortive rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth, or to the perjury prosecution of Titus Oates in the same year.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664 (footnote omitted).


More recent scholarship suggests that Section 10 of the Declaration of Rights was motivated more by Jeffreys’s treatment of Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric and convicted perjurer. In addition to the pillory, the scourge, and life imprisonment, Jeffreys sentenced Oates to be “stript of [his] Canonical Habits.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St.
Tr. 1227, 1316 (K.B. 1685)). Years after the sentence was carried out, and months after the passage of the Declaration of Rights, the House of Commons passed a bill to annul Oates’s sentence. Though the House of Lords never agreed, the Commons issued a report asserting that Oates’s sentence was the sort of “cruel and unusual Punishment” that Parliament complained of in the Declaration of Rights. *Harmelin*, 501 U.S. at 972 (citing 10 Journal of the House of Commons 247 (Aug. 2, 1689)). In the view of the Commons and the dissenting Lords, Oates’s punishment was “‘out of the Judges’ Power,’ ‘contrary to Law and ancient practice,’ without ‘Precedents’ or ‘express Law to warrant,’ ‘unusual,’ ‘illegal,’ or imposed by ‘Pretence to a discretionary Power.”’ *Id.* at 973 (quoting 1 Journals of the House of Lords 367 (May 31, 1689); 10 Journal of the House of Commons 247 (Aug. 2, 1689)).

Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that the prohibition on “cruell and unusuall punishments” as used in the English Declaration, “was primarily a requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of common-law tradition.” *Harmelin*, 501 U.S. at 974 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing *Ingraham*, 430 U.S. at 665; 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 710–12 (5th Am. ed. 1847); Anthony F. Granucci, *Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning*, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 859 (1969)).

But Justice Scalia was careful not to impute the English meaning of “cruell and unusuall” directly to the Framers of our Bill of Rights: “the ultimate question is not what ‘cruell and unusuall punishments’ meant in the Declaration of Rights, but what its meaning was to the Americans who adopted the Eighth Amendment.” *Id.* at 975. “Wrenched out of its common-law context, and applied to the actions of a
legislature . . . the Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment—specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed.” *Id.* at 976.

As support for his conclusion that the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended for the Eighth Amendment to reach only certain punishment methods, Justice Scalia looked to “the state ratifying conventions that prompted the Bill of Rights.” *Id.* at 979. Patrick Henry, speaking at the Virginia Ratifying convention, “decried the absence of a bill of rights,” arguing that “Congress will loose the restriction of not . . . inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. . . . What has distinguished our ancestors?—They would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.” *Id.* at 980 (quoting 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 447 (2d ed. 1854)). The Massachusetts Convention likewise heard the objection that, in the absence of a ban on cruel and unusual punishments, “racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of [Congress’s] discipline.” *Id.* at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 J. Debates on the Federal Constitution, at 111). These historical sources “confirm[] the view that the cruel and unusual punishments clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods of punishment.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Granucci, 57 Calif. L. Rev. at 842) (emphasis in *Harmelin*).

In addition, early state court decisions “interpreting state constitutional provisions with identical or more expansive wording (i.e., ‘cruel or unusual’) concluded that these provisions . . . proscribe[d] . . . only certain modes of punishment.” *Id.* at 983; see also *id.* at 982 ("Many other Americans apparently agreed that the Clause only outlawed certain modes of punishment.").
In short, when the Framers drafted and the several states ratified the Eighth Amendment, the original public meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was “to proscribe . . . methods of punishment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). There is simply no indication in the history of the Eighth Amendment that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to reach the substantive authority of Congress to criminalize acts or status, and certainly not before conviction. Incorporation, of course, extended the reach of the Clause to the States, but worked no change in its meaning.

II.

The panel here held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018). In so holding, the panel allows challenges asserting this prohibition to be brought in advance of any conviction. That holding, however, has nothing to do with the punishment that the City of Boise imposes for those offenses, and thus nothing to do with the text and tradition of the Eighth Amendment.

The panel pays only the barest attention to the Supreme Court’s admonition that the application of the Eighth Amendment to substantive criminal law be “sparing[],” Martin, 902 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667), and its holding here is dramatic in scope and completely unfaithful to the proper interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
“The primary purpose of (the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531–32 (1968)). It should, therefore, be the “rare case” where a court invokes the Eighth Amendment’s criminalization component. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rymer, J., dissenting), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). And permitting a pre-conviction challenge to a local ordinance, as the panel does here, is flatly inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s core constitutional function: regulating the methods of punishment that may be inflicted upon one convicted of an offense. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977, 979 (Scalia, J., concurring). As Judge Rymer, dissenting in Jones, observed, “the Eighth Amendment’s ‘protections do not attach until after conviction and sentence.’” 3 444 F.3d at 1147 (Rymer, J., dissenting)

2 Jones, of course, was vacated and lacks precedential value. 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007). But the panel here resuscitated Jones’s errant holding, including, apparently, its application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the absence of a criminal conviction. We should have taken this case en banc to correct this misinterpretation of the Eighth Amendment.

3 We have emphasized the need to proceed cautiously when extending the reach of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause beyond regulation of the methods of punishment that may be inflicted upon conviction for an offense. See United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1985) (repeating Ingraham’s direction that “this particular use of the cruel and unusual punishment clause is to be applied sparingly” and noting that Robinson represents “the rare type of case in which the clause has been used to limit what may be made criminal”); see also United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1994) (limiting application of Robinson
(internal alterations omitted) (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)).

The panel’s holding thus permits plaintiffs who have never been convicted of any offense to avail themselves of a constitutional protection that, historically, has been concerned with prohibition of “only certain modes of punishment.” *Harmelin*, 501 U.S. at 983; *see also United States v. Quinn*, 123 F.3d 1415, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing *Harmelin* for the proposition that a “plurality of the Supreme Court . . . has rejected the notion that the Eighth Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment extends to the type of offense for which a sentence is imposed”).

Extending the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to encompass pre-conviction challenges to substantive criminal law stretches the Eighth Amendment past its breaking point. I doubt that the drafters of our Bill of Rights, the legislators of the states that ratified it, or the public at the time would ever have imagined that a ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” would permit a plaintiff to challenge a substantive criminal statute or ordinance that he or she had not even been convicted of violating. We should have taken this case en banc to confirm that an Eighth Amendment challenge does not lie in the absence of a punishment following conviction for an offense.

to crimes lacking an actus reus). The panel’s holding here throws that caution to the wind.

4 Judge Friendly also expressed “considerable doubt that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is properly applicable at all until after conviction and sentence.” *Johnson v. Glick*, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973).
At common law and at the founding, a prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" was simply that: a limit on the types of punishments that government could inflict following a criminal conviction. The panel strayed far from the text and history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in imposing the substantive limits it has on the City of Boise, particularly as to plaintiffs who have not yet even been convicted of an offense. We should have reheard this case en banc, and I respectfully dissent.

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**OPINION**

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."

— Anatole France, *The Red Lily*

We consider whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars a city from prosecuting people criminally for sleeping outside on public property when those people have no home or other shelter to go to. We conclude that it does.

The plaintiffs-appellants are six current or former residents of the City of Boise ("the City"), who are homeless or have recently been homeless. Each plaintiff alleges that, between 2007 and 2009, he or she was cited by Boise police
for violating one or both of two city ordinances. The first, Boise City Code § 9-10-02 (the “Camping Ordinance”), makes it a misdemeanor to use “any of the streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places as a camping place at any time.” The Camping Ordinance defines “camping” as “the use of public property as a temporary or permanent place of dwelling, lodging, or residence.” Id. The second, Boise City Code § 6-01-05 (the “Disorderly Conduct Ordinance”), bans “[o]ccupying, lodging, or sleeping in any building, structure, or public place, whether public or private . . . without the permission of the owner or person entitled to possession or in control thereof.”

All plaintiffs seek retrospective relief for their previous citations under the ordinances. Two of the plaintiffs, Robert Anderson and Robert Martin, allege that they expect to be cited under the ordinances again in the future and seek declaratory and injunctive relief against future prosecution.

In Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), a panel of this court concluded that “so long as there is a greater number of homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number of available beds [in shelters]” for the homeless, Los Angeles could not enforce a similar ordinance against homeless individuals “for involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public.” Jones is not binding on us, as there was an underlying settlement between the parties and our opinion was vacated as a result. We agree with Jones’s reasoning and central conclusion, however, and so hold that an ordinance violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal sanctions against homeless individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public property, when no alternative shelter is available to them. Two of the plaintiffs, we further hold, may be entitled
to retrospective and prospective relief for violation of that Eighth Amendment right.

I. Background

The district court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims. We therefore review the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. *Tolan v. Cotton*, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).

Boise has a significant and increasing homeless population. According to the Point-in-Time Count ("PIT Count") conducted by the Idaho Housing and Finance Association, there were 753 homeless individuals in Ada County — the county of which Boise is the seat — in January 2014, 46 of whom were "unsheltered," or living in places unsuited to human habitation such as parks or sidewalks. In 2016, the last year for which data is available, there were 867 homeless individuals counted in Ada County, 125 of whom were unsheltered. The PIT Count likely underestimates the number of homeless individuals in Ada County. It is "widely recognized that a one-night point in

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1 The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") requires local homeless assistance and prevention networks to conduct an annual count of homeless individuals on one night each January, known as the PIT Count, as a condition of receiving federal funds. State, local, and federal governmental entities, as well as private service providers, rely on the PIT Count as a "critical source of data" on homelessness in the United States. The parties acknowledge that the PIT Count is not always precise. The City’s Director of Community Partnerships, Diana Lachiondo, testified that the PIT Count is "not always the ... best resource for numbers," but also stated that "the point-in-time count is our best snapshot" for counting the number of homeless individuals in a particular region, and that she "cannot give ... any other number with any kind of confidence."
time count will undercount the homeless population," as many homeless individuals may have access to temporary housing on a given night, and as weather conditions may affect the number of available volunteers and the number of homeless people staying at shelters or accessing services on the night of the count.

There are currently three homeless shelters in the City of Boise offering emergency shelter services, all run by private, nonprofit organizations. As far as the record reveals, these three shelters are the only shelters in Ada County.

One shelter — "Sanctuary" — is operated by Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. The shelter is open to men, women, and children of all faiths, and does not impose any religious requirements on its residents. Sanctuary has 96 beds reserved for individual men and women, with several additional beds reserved for families. The shelter uses floor mats when it reaches capacity with beds.

Because of its limited capacity, Sanctuary frequently has to turn away homeless people seeking shelter. In 2010, Sanctuary reached full capacity in the men's area "at least half of every month," and the women's area reached capacity "almost every night of the week." In 2014, the shelter reported that it was full for men, women, or both on 38% of nights. Sanctuary provides beds first to people who spent the previous night at Sanctuary. At 9:00 pm each night, it allots any remaining beds to those who added their names to the shelter's waiting list.
The other two shelters in Boise are both operated by the Boise Rescue Mission ("BRM"), a Christian nonprofit organization. One of those shelters, the River of Life Rescue Mission ("River of Life"), is open exclusively to men; the other, the City Light Home for Women and Children ("City Light"), shelters women and children only.

BRM’s facilities provide two primary “programs” for the homeless, the Emergency Services Program and the New Life Discipleship Program. The Emergency Services Program provides temporary shelter, food, and clothing to anyone in need. Christian religious services are offered to those seeking shelter through the Emergency Services Program. The shelters display messages and iconography on the walls, and the intake form for emergency shelter guests includes a religious message.

Homeless individuals may check in to either BRM facility between 4:00 and 5:30 pm. Those who arrive at BRM facilities between 5:30 and 8:00 pm may be denied shelter, depending on the reason for their late arrival; generally, anyone arriving after 8:00 pm is denied shelter.

Except in winter, male guests in the Emergency Services Program may stay at River of Life for up to 17 consecutive

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2 The record suggests that BRM provides some limited additional non-emergency shelter programming which, like the Discipleship Program, has overtly religious components.

3 The intake form states in relevant part that “We are a Gospel Rescue Mission. Gospel means ‘Good News,’ and the Good News is that Jesus saves us from sin past, present, and future. We would like to share the Good News with you. Have you heard of Jesus? . . . Would you like to know more about him?”
nights; women and children in the Emergency Services Program may stay at City Light for up to 30 consecutive nights. After the time limit is reached, homeless individuals who do not join the Discipleship Program may not return to a BRM shelter for at least 30 days. Participants in the Emergency Services Program must return to the shelter every night during the applicable 17-day or 30-day period; if a resident fails to check in to a BRM shelter each night, that resident is prohibited from staying overnight at that shelter for 30 days. BRM's rules on the length of a person's stay in the Emergency Services Program are suspended during the winter.

The Discipleship Program is an "intensive, Christ-based residential recovery program" of which "religious study is the very essence." The record does not indicate any limit to how long a member of the Discipleship Program may stay at a BRM shelter.

The River of Life shelter contains 148 beds for emergency use, along with 40 floor mats for overflow; 78 additional beds serve those in non-emergency shelter programs such as the Discipleship Program. The City Light shelter has 110 beds for emergency services, as well as 40 floor mats to handle overflow and 38 beds for women in non-emergency shelter programs. All told, Boise's three homeless shelters contain 354 beds and 92 overflow mats for homeless individuals.

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4 The parties dispute the extent to which BRM actually enforces the 17- and 30-day limits.
A. The Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Robert Martin, Robert Anderson, Lawrence Lee Smith, Basil E. Humphrey, Pamela S. Hawkes, and Janet F. Bell are all homeless individuals who have lived in or around Boise since at least 2007. Between 2007 and 2009, each plaintiff was convicted at least once of violating the Camping Ordinance, the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance, or both. With one exception, all plaintiffs were sentenced to time served for all convictions; on two occasions, Hawkes was sentenced to one additional day in jail. During the same period, Hawkes was cited, but not convicted, under the Camping Ordinance, and Martin was cited, but not convicted, under the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance.

Plaintiff Robert Anderson currently lives in Boise; he is homeless and has often relied on Boise’s shelters for housing. In the summer of 2007, Anderson stayed at River of Life as part of the Emergency Services Program until he reached the shelter’s 17-day limit for male guests. Anderson testified that during his 2007 stay at River of Life, he was required to attend chapel services before he was permitted to eat dinner. At the conclusion of his 17-day stay, Anderson declined to enter the Discipleship Program because of his religious beliefs. As Anderson was barred by the shelter’s policies from returning to River of Life for 30 days, he slept outside for the next several weeks. On September 1, 2007, Anderson was cited under the Camping Ordinance. He pled guilty to violating the Camping Ordinance and paid a $25 fine; he did not appeal his conviction.

Plaintiff Robert Martin is a former resident of Boise who currently lives in Post Falls, Idaho. Martin returns frequently to Boise to visit his minor son. In March of 2009, Martin was
cited under the Camping Ordinance for sleeping outside; he was cited again in 2012 under the same ordinance.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in October of 2009. All plaintiffs alleged that their previous citations under the Camping Ordinance and the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and sought damages for those alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138. Anderson and Martin also sought prospective declaratory and injunctive relief precluding future enforcement of the ordinances under the same statute and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.

After this litigation began, the Boise Police Department promulgated a new “Special Order,” effective as of January 1, 2010, that prohibited enforcement of either the Camping Ordinance or the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance against any homeless person on public property on any night when no shelter had “an available overnight space.” City police implemented the Special Order through a two-step procedure known as the “Shelter Protocol.”

Under the Shelter Protocol, if any shelter in Boise reaches capacity on a given night, that shelter will so notify the police at roughly 11:00 pm. Each shelter has discretion to determine whether it is full, and Boise police have no other mechanism or criteria for gauging whether a shelter is full. Since the Shelter Protocol was adopted, Sanctuary has reported that it was full on almost 40% of nights. Although BRM agreed to the Shelter Protocol, its internal policy is never to turn any
person away because of a lack of space, and neither BRM shelter has ever reported that it was full.

If all shelters are full on the same night, police are to refrain from enforcing either ordinance. Presumably because the BRM shelters have not reported full, Boise police continue to issue citations regularly under both ordinances.

In July 2011, the district court granted summary judgment to the City. It held that the plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief were barred under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and that their claims for prospective relief were mooted by the Special Order and the Shelter Protocol. *Bell v. City of Boise*, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Idaho 2011). On appeal, we reversed and remanded. *Bell v. City of Boise*, 709 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2013). We held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *Id.* at 897. In so holding, we expressly declined to consider whether the favorable-termination requirement from *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), applied to the plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief. Instead, we left the issue for the district court on remand. *Bell*, 709 F.3d at 897 n.11.

*Bell* further held that the plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief were not moot. The City had not met its "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the challenged conduct — enforcement of the two ordinances against homeless individuals with no access to shelter — "could not reasonably be expected to recur." *Id.* at 898, 901 (quoting *Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC)*, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). We emphasized that the Special Order was a statement of administrative policy and so could be amended
or reversed at any time by the Boise Chief of Police. *Id.* at 899–900.

Finally, *Bell* rejected the City’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek prospective relief because they were no longer homeless. *Id.* at 901 & n.12. We noted that, on summary judgment, the plaintiffs “need not establish that they in fact have standing, but only that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the standing elements.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to the City on the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. The court observed that *Heck* requires a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” to demonstrate that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87. According to the district court, “a judgment finding the Ordinances unconstitutional . . . necessarily would imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs’ [previous] convictions under those ordinances,” and the plaintiffs therefore were required to demonstrate that their convictions or sentences had already been invalidated. As none of the plaintiffs had raised an Eighth Amendment challenge as a defense to criminal prosecution, nor had any plaintiff successfully appealed their conviction, the district court held that all of the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief were barred by *Heck*. The district court also rejected as barred by *Heck* the plaintiffs’ claim for prospective injunctive relief under § 1983, reasoning that “a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on even a
prospective § 1983 claim would demonstrate the invalidity of any confinement stemming from those convictions."

Finally, the district court determined that, although Heck did not bar relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Martin and Anderson now lack standing to pursue such relief. The linchpin of this holding was that the Camping Ordinance and the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance were both amended in 2014 to codify the Special Order’s mandate that “[l]aw enforcement officers shall not enforce [the ordinances] when the individual is on public property and there is no available overnight shelter.” Boise City Code §§ 6-01-05, 9-10-02. Because the ordinances, as amended, permitted camping or sleeping in a public place when no shelter space was available, the court held that there was no “credible threat” of future prosecution. “If the Ordinances are not to be enforced when the shelters are full, those Ordinances do not inflict a constitutional injury upon these particular plaintiffs . . . .” The court emphasized that the record “suggests there is no known citation of a homeless individual under the Ordinances for camping or sleeping on public property on any night or morning when he or she was unable to secure shelter due to a lack of shelter capacity” and that “there has not been a single night when all three shelters in Boise called in to report they were simultaneously full for men, women or families.”

This appeal followed.
II. Discussion

A. Standing

We first consider whether any of the plaintiffs has standing to pursue prospective relief.\(^5\) We conclude that there are sufficient opposing facts in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Martin and Anderson face a credible threat of prosecution under one or both ordinances in the future at a time when they are unable to stay at any Boise homeless shelter.\(^6\)

"To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." \(Clapper\ v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)\) (citation omitted). "Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes — that the injury is certainly impending." \(Id.\) (citation omitted). A plaintiff need not, however, await an arrest or prosecution to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute. "When the plaintiff has alleged an

\(^5\) Standing to pursue retrospective relief is not in doubt. The only threshold question affecting the availability of a claim for retrospective relief — a question we address in the next section — is whether such relief is barred by the doctrine established in \(Heck.\)

\(^6\) Although the SAC is somewhat ambiguous regarding which of the plaintiffs seeks prospective relief, counsel for the plaintiffs made clear at oral argument that only two of the plaintiffs, Martin and Anderson, seek such relief, and the district court considered the standing question with respect to Martin and Anderson only.
intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” *Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union*, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment premised on an alleged lack of standing, plaintiffs “need not establish that they in fact have standing, but only that there is a genuine question of material fact as to the standing elements.” *Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States*, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).

In dismissing Martin and Anderson’s claims for declaratory relief for lack of standing, the district court emphasized that Boise’s ordinances, as amended in 2014, preclude the City from issuing a citation when there is no available space at a shelter, and there is consequently no risk that either Martin or Anderson will be cited under such circumstances in the future. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot agree.

Although the 2014 amendments preclude the City from enforcing the ordinances when there is no room available at any shelter, the record demonstrates that the City is wholly reliant on the shelters to self-report when they are full. It is undisputed that Sanctuary is full as to men on a substantial percentage of nights, perhaps as high as 50%. The City nevertheless emphasizes that since the adoption of the Shelter Protocol in 2010, the BRM facilities, River of Life and City Light, have never reported that they are full, and BRM states that it will never turn people away due to lack space.
The plaintiffs have pointed to substantial evidence in the record, however, indicating that whether or not the BRM facilities are ever full or turn homeless individuals away for lack of space, they do refuse to shelter homeless people who exhaust the number of days allotted by the facilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege, and the City does not dispute, that it is BRM's policy to limit men to 17 consecutive days in the Emergency Services Program, after which they cannot return to River of Life for 30 days; City Light has a similar 30-day limit for women and children. Anderson testified that BRM has enforced this policy against him in the past, forcing him to sleep outdoors.

The plaintiffs have adduced further evidence indicating that River of Life permits individuals to remain at the shelter after 17 days in the Emergency Services Program only on the condition that they become part of the New Life Discipleship program, which has a mandatory religious focus. For example, there is evidence that participants in the New Life Program are not allowed to spend days at Corpus Christi, a local Catholic program, “because it’s . . . a different sect.” There are also facts in dispute concerning whether the Emergency Services Program itself has a religious component. Although the City argues strenuously that the Emergency Services Program is secular, Anderson testified to the contrary; he stated that he was once required to attend chapel before being permitted to eat dinner at the River of Life shelter. Both Martin and Anderson have objected to the overall religious atmosphere of the River of Life shelter, including the Christian messaging on the shelter's intake form and the Christian iconography on the shelter walls. A city cannot, via the threat of prosecution, coerce an individual to attend religion-based treatment programs consistently with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Inouye v.
Yet at the conclusion of a 17-day stay at River of Life, or a 30-day stay at City Light, an individual may be forced to choose between sleeping outside on nights when Sanctuary is full (and risking arrest under the ordinances), or enrolling in BRM programming that is antithetical to his or her religious beliefs.

The 17-day and 30-day limits are not the only BRM policies which functionally limit access to BRM facilities even when space is nominally available. River of Life also turns individuals away if they voluntarily leave the shelter before the 17-day limit and then attempt to return within 30 days. An individual who voluntarily leaves a BRM facility for any reason — perhaps because temporary shelter is available at Sanctuary, or with friends or family, or in a hotel — cannot immediately return to the shelter if circumstances change. Moreover, BRM's facilities may deny shelter to any individual who arrives after 5:30 pm, and generally will deny shelter to anyone arriving after 8:00 pm. Sanctuary, however, does not assign beds to persons on its waiting list until 9:00 pm. Thus, by the time a homeless individual on the Sanctuary waiting list discovers that the shelter has no room available, it may be too late to seek shelter at either BRM facility.

So, even if we credit the City's evidence that BRM's facilities have never been "full," and that the City has never cited any person under the ordinances who could not obtain shelter "due to a lack of shelter capacity," there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether homeless individuals in Boise run a credible risk of being issued a citation on a night when Sanctuary is full and they have been denied entry to a BRM facility for reasons other than shelter capacity. If so, then as a practical matter, no shelter is
available. We note that despite the Shelter Protocol and the amendments to both ordinances, the City continues regularly to issue citations for violating both ordinances; during the first three months of 2015, the Boise Police Department issued over 175 such citations.

The City argues that Martin faces little risk of prosecution under either ordinance because he has not lived in Boise since 2013. Martin states, however, that he is still homeless and still visits Boise several times a year to visit his minor son, and that he has continued to seek shelter at Sanctuary and River of Life. Although Martin may no longer spend enough time in Boise to risk running afoul of BRM’s 17-day limit, he testified that he has unsuccessfully sought shelter at River of Life after being placed on Sanctuary’s waiting list, only to discover later in the evening that Sanctuary had no available beds. Should Martin return to Boise to visit his son, there is a reasonable possibility that he might again seek shelter at Sanctuary, only to discover (after BRM has closed for the night) that Sanctuary has no space for him. Anderson, for his part, continues to live in Boise and states that he remains homeless.

We conclude that both Martin and Anderson have demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they face a credible risk of prosecution under the ordinances in the future on a night when they have been denied access to Boise’s homeless shelters; both plaintiffs therefore have standing to seek prospective relief.

B. Heck v. Humphrey

We turn next to the impact of Heck v. Humphrey and its progeny on this case. With regard to retrospective relief, the
plaintiffs maintain that *Heck* should not bar their claims because, with one exception, all of the plaintiffs were sentenced to time served.\(^7\) It would therefore have been impossible for the plaintiffs to obtain federal habeas relief, as any petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be filed while the petitioner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); *Spencer v. Kemna*, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 17–18 (1998). With regard to prospective relief, the plaintiffs emphasize that they seek only equitable protection against *future* enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute, and not to invalidate any prior conviction under the same statute. We hold that although the *Heck* line of cases precludes most — but not all — of the plaintiffs’ requests for retrospective relief, that doctrine has no application to the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction enjoining prospective enforcement of the ordinances.

1. **The *Heck* Doctrine**

A long line of Supreme Court case law, beginning with *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), holds that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his or her confinement, but must instead seek federal habeas corpus relief or analogous state relief. *Id.* at 477, 500. *Preiser* considered whether a prison inmate could bring a § 1983 action seeking an injunction to remedy an unconstitutional deprivation of good-time conduct credits. Observing that habeas corpus is the traditional instrument to obtain release from unlawful

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\(^7\) Plaintiff Pamela Hawkes was convicted of violating the Camping Ordinance or Disorderly Conduct Ordinance on twelve occasions; although she was usually sentenced to time served, she was twice sentenced to one additional day in jail.
confinement, *Preiser* recognized an implicit exception from § 1983's broad scope for actions that lie "within the core of habeas corpus" — specifically, challenges to the "fact or duration" of confinement. *Id.* at 487, 500. The Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that although *Preiser* barred inmates from obtaining an injunction to restore good-time credits via a § 1983 action, *Preiser* did not "preclude a litigant with standing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations." *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (emphasis added).

*Heck* addressed a § 1983 action brought by an inmate seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The inmate alleged that state and county officials had engaged in unlawful investigations and knowing destruction of exculpatory evidence. *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 479. The Court in *Heck* analogized a § 1983 action of this type, which called into question the validity of an underlying conviction, to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, *id.* at 483–84, and went on to hold that, as with a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff in such an action must demonstrate a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings before seeking tort relief, *id.* at 486–87. "[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." *Id.*
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) extended Heck's holding to claims for declaratory relief. Id. at 648. The plaintiff in Edwards alleged that he had been deprived of earned good-time credits without due process of law, because the decisionmaker in disciplinary proceedings had concealed exculpatory evidence. Because the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief was “based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,” Edwards held, it was “not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. Edwards went on to hold, however, that a requested injunction requiring prison officials to date-stamp witness statements was not Heck-barred, reasoning that a “prayer for such prospective relief will not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought under § 1983.” Id. (emphasis added).

Most recently, Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), stated that Heck bars § 1983 suits even when the relief sought is prospective injunctive or declaratory relief, “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–82 (emphasis omitted). But Wilkinson held that the plaintiff's in that case could seek a prospective injunction compelling the state to comply with constitutional requirements in parole proceedings in the future. The Court observed that the prisoners' claims for future relief, “if successful, will not necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration.” Id. at 82.

The Supreme Court did not, in these cases or any other, conclusively determine whether Heck's favorable-termination requirement applies to convicts who have no practical opportunity to challenge their conviction or sentence via a

The petitioner in Spencer had filed a federal habeas petition seeking to invalidate an order revoking his parole. While the habeas petition was pending, the petitioner’s term of imprisonment expired, and his habeas petition was consequently dismissed as moot. Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which three other Justices joined, addressing the petitioner’s argument that if his habeas petition were mooted by his release, any § 1983 action would be barred under Heck, yet he would no longer have access to a federal habeas forum to challenge the validity of his parole revocation. Id. at 18–19 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter stated that in his view “Heck has no such effect,” and that “a former prisoner, no longer ‘in custody,’ may bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable-termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy.” Id. at 21. Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated that he would have held the habeas petition in Spencer not moot, but agreed that “[g]iven the Court’s holding that petitioner does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear . . . that he may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Relying on the concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer, we have held that the “unavailability of a remedy in habeas corpus because of mootness” permitted a plaintiff released from custody to maintain a § 1983 action for damages, “even though success in that action would imply the
invalidity of the disciplinary proceeding that caused revocation of his good-time credits.” *Nonnette v. Small*, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). But we have limited *Nonnette* in recent years. Most notably, we held in *Lyall v. City of Los Angeles*, 807 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2015), that even where a plaintiff had no practical opportunity to pursue federal habeas relief while detained because of the short duration of his confinement, *Heck* bars a § 1983 action that would imply the invalidity of a prior conviction if the plaintiff could have sought invalidation of the underlying conviction via direct appeal or state post-conviction relief, but did not do so. *Id.* at 1192 & n.12.

2. Retrospective Relief

Here, the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief are governed squarely by *Lyall*. It is undisputed that all the plaintiffs not only failed to challenge their convictions on direct appeal but expressly waived the right to do so as a condition of their guilty pleas. The plaintiffs have made no showing that any of their convictions were invalidated via state post-conviction relief. We therefore hold that all but two of the plaintiffs’ claims for damages are foreclosed under *Lyall*.

Two of the plaintiffs, however, Robert Martin and Pamela Hawkes, also received citations under the ordinances that were dismissed before the state obtained a conviction. Hawkes was cited for violating the Camping Ordinance on July 8, 2007; that violation was dismissed on August 28, 2007. Martin was cited for violating the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance on April 24, 2009; those charges were dismissed on September 9, 2009. The complaint alleges two injuries stemming from these dismissed citations: (1) the continued
inclusion of the citations on plaintiffs' criminal records; and (2) the accumulation of a host of criminal fines and incarceration costs. Plaintiffs seek orders compelling the City to “expunge[] . . . the records of any homeless individuals unlawfully cited or arrested and charged under [the Ordinances]” and “reimburse[] . . . any criminal fines paid . . . [or] costs of incarceration billed.”

With respect to these two incidents, the district court erred in finding that the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenge was barred by Heck. Where there is no “conviction or sentence” that may be undermined by a grant of relief to the plaintiffs, the Heck doctrine has no application. 512 U.S. at 486–87; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007).

Relying on Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977), the City argues that the Eighth Amendment, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in particular, have no application where there has been no conviction. The City's reliance on Ingraham is misplaced. As the Supreme Court observed in Ingraham, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause not only limits the types of punishment that may be imposed and prohibits the imposition of punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, but also “imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.” Id. at 667. “This [latter] protection governs the criminal law process as a whole, not only the imposition of punishment postconviction.” Jones, 444 F.3d at 1128.

Ingraham concerned only whether “impositions outside the criminal process” — in that case, the paddling of schoolchildren — “constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.” 430 U.S. at 667. *Ingraham* did not hold that a plaintiff challenging the state’s power to criminalize a particular status or conduct in the first instance, as the plaintiffs in this case do, must first be convicted. If conviction were a prerequisite for such a challenge, “the state could in effect punish individuals in the preconviction stages of the criminal law enforcement process for being or doing things that under the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] cannot be subject to the criminal process.” *Jones,* 444 F.3d at 1129. For those rare Eighth Amendment challenges concerning the state’s very power to criminalize particular behavior or status, then, a plaintiff need demonstrate only the initiation of the criminal process against him, not a conviction.

3. Prospective Relief

The district court also erred in concluding that the plaintiffs’ requests for prospective injunctive relief were barred by *Heck*. The district court relied entirely on language in *Wilkinson* stating that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) . . . no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief) . . . *if* success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” *Wilkinson,* 544 U.S. at 81–82. The district court concluded from this language in *Wilkinson* that a person convicted under an allegedly unconstitutional statute may never challenge the validity or application of that statute after the initial criminal proceeding is complete, even when the relief sought is prospective only and independent of the prior conviction. The logical extension of the district court’s interpretation is that an individual who does not successfully invalidate a first conviction under an unconstitutional statute will have no opportunity to challenge
that statute prospectively so as to avoid arrest and conviction for violating that same statute in the future.

Neither Wilkinson nor any other case in the Heck line supports such a result. Rather, Wolff, Edwards, and Wilkinson compel the opposite conclusion.

Wolff held that although Preiser barred a § 1983 action seeking restoration of good-time credits absent a successful challenge in federal habeas proceedings, Preiser did not “preclude a litigant with standing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the prospective enforcement of invalid . . . regulations.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555. Although Wolff was decided before Heck, the Court subsequently made clear that Heck effected no change in the law in this regard, observing in Edwards that “[o]rdinarily, a prayer for . . . prospective [injunctive] relief will not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of a previous loss of good-time credits, and so may properly be brought under § 1983.” Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added). Importantly, the Court held in Edwards that although the plaintiff could not, consistently with Heck, seek a declaratory judgment stating that the procedures employed by state officials that deprived him of good-time credits were unconstitutional, he could seek an injunction barring such allegedly unconstitutional procedures in the future. Id. Finally, the Court noted in Wilkinson that the Heck line of cases “has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement,” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added), alluding to an existing confinement, not one yet to come.
The *Heck* doctrine, in other words, serves to ensure the finality and validity of previous convictions, not to insulate future prosecutions from challenge. In context, it is clear that Wilkinson’s holding that the *Heck* doctrine bars a § 1983 action “no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief) . . . if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration” applies to equitable relief concerning an existing confinement, not to suits seeking to preclude an unconstitutional confinement in the future, arising from incidents occurring after any prior conviction and stemming from a possible later prosecution and conviction. *Id.* at 81–82 (emphasis added). As Wilkinson held, “claims for future relief (which, if successful, will not necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration)” are distant from the “core” of habeas corpus with which the *Heck* line of cases is concerned, and are not precluded by the *Heck* doctrine. *Id.* at 82.

In sum, we hold that the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief are barred by *Heck*, but both Martin and Hawkes stated claims for damages to which *Heck* has no application. We further hold that *Heck* has no application to the plaintiffs’ requests for prospective injunctive relief.

**C. The Eighth Amendment**

At last, we turn to the merits — does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment preclude the enforcement of a statute prohibiting sleeping outside against homeless individuals with no access to alternative shelter? We hold that it does, for essentially the same reasons articulated in the now-vacated *Jones* opinion.
The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “circumscribes the criminal process in three ways.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667. First, it limits the type of punishment the government may impose; second, it proscribes punishment “grossly disproportionate” to the severity of the crime; and third, it places substantive limits on what the government may criminalize. Id. It is the third limitation that is pertinent here.

“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). Cases construing substantive limits as to what the government may criminalize are rare, however, and for good reason — the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s third limitation is “one to be applied sparingly.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667.

Robinson, the seminal case in this branch of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, held a California statute that “ma[de] the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense” invalid under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 370 U.S. at 666. The California law at issue in Robinson was “not one which punishe[d] a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration”; it punished addiction itself. Id. Recognizing narcotics addiction as an illness or disease — “apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily” — and observing that a “law which made a criminal offense of . . . a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,” Robinson held
the challenged statute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. *Id.* at 666–67.

As *Jones* observed, *Robinson* did not explain at length the principles underpinning its holding. *See Jones*, 444 F.3d at 1133. In *Powell v. Texas*, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), however, the Court elaborated on the principle first articulated in *Robinson*.

*Powell* concerned the constitutionality of a Texas law making public drunkenness a criminal offense. Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality of the Court, distinguished the Texas statute from the law at issue in *Robinson* on the ground that the Texas statute made criminal not alcoholism but *conduct* — appearing in public while intoxicated. "[A]ppellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did in *Robinson*; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant’s behavior in the privacy of his own home.” *Id.* at 532 (plurality opinion).

The *Powell* plurality opinion went on to interpret *Robinson* as precluding only the criminalization of “status,” not of “involuntary” conduct. "The entire thrust of *Robinson*’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus. It thus does not deal with the question of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense, ‘involuntary’ . . . .” *Id.* at 533.
Four Justices dissented from the Court’s holding in Powell; Justice White concurred in the result alone. Notably, Justice White noted that many chronic alcoholics are also homeless, and that for those individuals, public drunkenness may be unavoidable as a practical matter. “For all practical purposes the public streets may be home for these unfortunates, not because their disease compels them to be there, but because, drunk or sober, they have no place else to go and no place else to be when they are drinking. . . . For some of these alcoholics I would think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible. As applied to them this statute is in effect a law which bans a single act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendment — the act of getting drunk.” Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).

The four dissenting Justices adopted a position consistent with that taken by Justice White: that under Robinson, “criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change,” and that the defendant, “once intoxicated, . . . could not prevent himself from appearing in public places.” Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Thus, five Justices gleaned from Robinson the principle that “that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status or being.” Jones, 444 F.3d at 1135; see also United States v. Roberston, 875 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2017).

This principle compels the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter. As Jones
reasoned, "[w]hether sitting, lying, and sleeping are defined as acts or conditions, they are universal and unavoidable consequences of being human." Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136. Moreover, any "conduct at issue here is involuntary and inseparable from status — they are one and the same, given that human beings are biologically compelled to rest, whether by sitting, lying, or sleeping." Id. As a result, just as the state may not criminalize the state of being "homeless in public places," the state may not "criminalize conduct that is an unavoidable consequence of being homeless — namely sitting, lying, or sleeping on the streets." Id. at 1137.

Our holding is a narrow one. Like the Jones panel, "we in no way dictate to the City that it must provide sufficient shelter for the homeless, or allow anyone who wishes to sit, lie, or sleep on the streets . . . at any time and at any place." Id. at 1138. We hold only that "so long as there is a greater number of homeless individuals in [a jurisdiction] than the number of available beds [in shelters]," the jurisdiction cannot prosecute homeless individuals for "involuntarily sitting, lying, and sleeping in public." Id. That is, as long as there is no option of sleeping indoors, the government cannot criminalize indigent, homeless people for sleeping outdoors, on public property, on the false premise they had a choice in the matter.8

8 Naturally, our holding does not cover individuals who do have access to adequate temporary shelter, whether because they have the means to pay for it or because it is realistically available to them for free, but who choose not to use it. Nor do we suggest that a jurisdiction with insufficient shelter can never criminalize the act of sleeping outside. Even where shelter is unavailable, an ordinance prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at particular times or in particular locations might well be constitutionally permissible. See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1123. So, too, might an ordinance barring the obstruction of public rights of way or the erection
We are not alone in reaching this conclusion. As one court has observed, “resisting the need to eat, sleep or engage in other life-sustaining activities is impossible. Avoiding public places when engaging in this otherwise innocent conduct is also impossible. . . . As long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for something for which they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment — sleeping, eating and other innocent conduct.” *Pottinger v. City of Miami*, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also *Johnson v. City of Dallas*, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that a “sleeping in public ordinance as applied against the homeless is unconstitutional”), rev’d on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).

Here, the two ordinances criminalize the simple act of sleeping outside on public property, whether bare or with a of certain structures. Whether some other ordinance is consistent with the Eighth Amendment will depend, as here, on whether it punishes a person for lacking the means to live out the “universal and unavoidable consequences of being human” in the way the ordinance prescribes. *Id.* at 1136.

9 In *Joel v. City of Orlando*, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit upheld an anti-camping ordinance similar to Boise’s against an Eighth Amendment challenge. In *Joel*, however, the defendants presented unrebutted evidence that the homeless shelters in the City of Orlando had never reached capacity and that the plaintiffs had always enjoyed access to shelter space. *Id.* Those unrebutted facts were critical to the court’s holding. *Id.* As discussed below, the plaintiffs here have demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether they have been denied access to shelter in the past or expect to be so denied in the future. *Joel* therefore does not provide persuasive guidance for this case.
blanket or other basic bedding. The Disorderly Conduct Ordinance, on its face, criminalizes “[o]ccupying, lodging, or sleeping in any building, structure or place, whether public or private” without permission. Boise City Code § 6-01-05. Its scope is just as sweeping as the Los Angeles ordinance at issue in Jones, which mandated that “[n]o person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public way.” 444 F.3d at 1123.

The Camping Ordinance criminalizes using “any of the streets, sidewalks, parks or public places as a camping place at any time.” Boise City Code § 9-10-02. The ordinance defines “camping” broadly:

The term “camp” or “camping” shall mean the use of public property as a temporary or permanent place of dwelling, lodging, or residence, or as a living accommodation at anytime between sunset and sunrise, or as a sojourn. Indicia of camping may include, but are not limited to, storage of personal belongings, using tents or other temporary structures for sleeping or storage of personal belongings, carrying on cooking activities or making any fire in an unauthorized area, or any of these activities in combination with one another or in combination with either sleeping or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping).

Id. It appears from the record that the Camping Ordinance is frequently enforced against homeless individuals with some elementary bedding, whether or not any of the other listed
indicia of “camping” — the erection of temporary structures, the activity of cooking or making fire, or the storage of personal property — are present. For example, a Boise police officer testified that he cited plaintiff Pamela Hawkes under the Camping Ordinance for sleeping outside “wrapped in a blanket with her sandals off and next to her,” for sleeping in a public restroom “with blankets,” and for sleeping in a park “on a blanket, wrapped in blankets on the ground.” The Camping Ordinance therefore can be, and allegedly is, enforced against homeless individuals who take even the most rudimentary precautions to protect themselves from the elements. We conclude that a municipality cannot criminalize such behavior consistently with the Eighth Amendment when no sleeping space is practically available in any shelter.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to the plaintiffs’ requests for retrospective relief, except as such claims relate to Hawkes’s July 2007 citation under the Camping Ordinance and Martin’s April 2009 citation under the Disorderly Conduct Ordinance. We REVERSE and REMAND with respect to the plaintiffs’ requests for prospective relief, both declaratory and injunctive, and to the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief insofar as they relate to Hawkes’ July 2007 citation or Martin’s April 2009 citation.10

10 Costs shall be awarded to the plaintiffs.
OWENS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages that are based on convictions that have not been challenged on direct appeal or invalidated in state post-conviction relief. See Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1192 n.12 (9th Cir. 2015).

I also agree that Heck and its progeny have no application where there is no “conviction or sentence” that would be undermined by granting a plaintiff’s request for relief under § 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007). I therefore concur in the majority’s conclusion that Heck does not bar plaintiffs Robert Martin and Pamela Hawkes from seeking retrospective relief for the two instances in which they received citations, but not convictions. I also concur in the majority’s Eighth Amendment analysis as to those two claims for retrospective relief.

Where I part ways with the majority is in my understanding of Heck’s application to the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court explained where the Heck doctrine stands today:

[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Id. at 81–82. Here, the majority acknowledges this language in Wilkinson, but concludes that Heck’s bar on any type of relief that “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement” does not preclude the prospective claims at issue. The majority reasons that the purpose of Heck is “to ensure the finality and validity of previous convictions, not to insulate future prosecutions from challenge,” and so concludes that the plaintiffs’ prospective claims may proceed. I respectfully disagree.

A declaration that the city ordinances are unconstitutional and an injunction against their future enforcement necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the plaintiffs’ prior convictions. Indeed, any time an individual challenges the constitutionality of a substantive criminal statute under which he has been convicted, he asks for a judgment that would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction. And though neither the Supreme Court nor this court has squarely addressed Heck’s application to § 1983 claims challenging the constitutionality of a substantive criminal statute, I believe Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), makes clear that Heck prohibits such challenges. In Edwards, the Supreme Court explained that although our court had recognized that Heck barred § 1983 claims challenging the validity of a prisoner’s confinement “as a substantive matter,” it improperly distinguished as not Heck-barred all claims alleging only procedural violations. 520 U.S. at 645. In holding that Heck also barred those procedural claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the Court did not question our conclusion that claims challenging a conviction “as a substantive matter” are barred by Heck.
Id.; see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (holding that the plaintiffs’ claims could proceed because the relief requested would only “render invalid the state procedures” and “a favorable judgment [would] not ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] conviction[s] or sentence[s]’” (emphasis added) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487)).

Edwards thus leads me to conclude that an individual who was convicted under a criminal statute, but who did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute at the time of his conviction through direct appeal or post-conviction relief, cannot do so in the first instance by seeking declaratory or injunctive relief under §1983. See Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1316 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005) (assuming that a §1983 claim challenging “the constitutionality of the ordinance under which [the petitioner was convicted]” would be Heck-barred). I therefore would hold that Heck bars the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

We are not the first court to struggle applying Heck to “real life examples,” nor will we be the last. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 21 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that her thoughts on Heck had changed since she joined the majority opinion in that case). If the slate were blank, I would agree that the majority’s holding as to prospective relief makes good sense. But because I read Heck and its progeny differently, I dissent as to that section of the majority’s opinion. I otherwise join the majority in full.
No. 19-247

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CITY OF BOISE,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT MARTIN, LAWRENCE LEE SMITH,
ROBERT ANDERSON, JANET F. BELL, PAMELA S. HAWKES,
AND BASIL E. HUMPHREY,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE CALIFORNIA
STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES AND
33 CALIFORNIA COUNTIES AND CITIES
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

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September 24, 2019
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici comprise the California State Association of Counties ("CSAC") and a coalition of 33 California counties and cities providing short- and long-term solutions to the state's homelessness crisis.

CSAC is a non-profit corporation whose membership consists of the 58 California counties. CSAC sponsors a Litigation Coordination Program administered by the County Counsels' Association of California and overseen by the Association's Litigation Overview Committee, comprised of county counsels throughout the state. The Litigation Overview Committee monitors litigation of concern to counties statewide and determined that this case is a matter affecting all counties.

Amici coalition members have collectively devoted hundreds of millions of dollars and countless hours of public employee time providing services and housing for the homeless in a manner that recognizes the dignity of homeless individuals and addresses critical public health and safety concerns affecting both unsheltered and sheltered residents in their jurisdictions.

Yet, as Judge Milan Smith recognized in his dissent from denial of en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case requires municipalities to make the Hobson’s Choice of “either undertaking an

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for Amici certifies that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity other than Amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the brief's preparation or submission. All parties' counsel of record provided blanket consent for the filing of amicus briefs and received timely notice regarding the filing of this brief.

2 A complete list of Amici is set forth in the appendix.
overwhelming financial responsibility to provide housing for or count[ing] the number of homeless individuals within their jurisdiction every night, or abandon[ing] enforcement of a host of laws regulating public health and safety.” Pet. App. 15a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).

If left to stand, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will sow confusion and significantly impact Amici, who have a substantial interest in enforcing critical public health and safety laws without incurring the threat of civil liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. This confusion and potential liability are further magnified because the California Supreme Court reached a contradictory conclusion on this issue—a ruling that California trial and appellate courts are bound to follow notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s holding below. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1150, 1166 (Cal. 1995).

For all of these reasons, Amici have an acute interest in this Court granting certiorari.

**SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

No one doubts the severity of the nation’s homelessness crisis or the need for more housing and support services. In the face of this crisis, counties and cities throughout California—where nearly half of the nation’s unsheltered population resides—have developed creative and effective solutions and devoted extraordinary resources to provide temporary shelter and social services for homeless individuals while making efforts to build more permanent supportive housing. The Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, threatens to derail these efforts by imposing an ill-defined and unworkable standard.
The decision below not only leaves municipalities at an interpretive loss by creating more questions than it answers but also places an enormous financial and logistical burden on them, exposes them to costly and wasteful litigation while leaving no room for error, and calls a host of essential public health and safety laws into constitutional doubt. At the same time, the decision makes it harder for local governments to protect unsheltered and sheltered individuals from the unprecedented fire, flood, and environmental hazards California communities currently face without risking potential civil liability including attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

Unless this Court grants review, the Ninth Circuit’s “decision [will] generate[] dire practical consequences for the hundreds of local governments within [its] jurisdiction, and for the millions of people that reside therein.” Pet. App. 15a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).

ARGUMENT

I. California Counties and Cities Are on the Front Lines of the Nation’s Homelessness Crisis.

California is in many ways the epicenter of both the homelessness crisis and the most creative and effective approaches to ameliorate that crisis. Coalition members have played a critical role in developing these solutions, expending extraordinary resources to assist homeless individuals.

A. California is home to 21 of the 30 most expensive housing rental markets in the nation and lacks sufficient affordable housing to meet the demand of low-
The state’s 2.2 million extremely low-income and very low-income renter households compete for 664,000 affordable rental homes. In January 2018, “nearly half of all unsheltered people in the country were in California (47% or 89,543).” Because many homeless individuals also suffer from mental illness or substance abuse, helping individuals end the cycle of homelessness often requires both housing and intensive support services.

Homelessness in California is occurring “not just in major cities and urban areas but also in rural [communities], in our heavily forested areas, along our rivers and in our suburban neighborhoods.” For example, Los Angeles County is home to the nation’s largest unsheltered population (approximately 44,214) and San Diego County is home to the nation’s fifth-largest homeless population. Between 2013 and 2018, Orange County “experienced a 53-percent increase in the unsheltered homeless population.”

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4 Ibid.


7 Id. at 8.
and 2019, the number of unsheltered individuals in San Joaquin County nearly tripled.

B. As the Institute for Local Government observed, "[a] number of California counties and cities have been pioneers in homeless services." The following is a sampling of these creative and proactive approaches to assist the state’s growing unsheltered population.

**Declaring a Shelter Crisis.** Dozens of California cities and counties have declared a shelter crisis, collectively entitling them to millions of dollars in state funding under the Homeless Emergency Aid Program ("HEAP") for emergency assistance to those experiencing homelessness or at imminent risk of homelessness. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 50211(a) (creating HEAP “for the purpose of providing localities with one-time flexible block grant funds to address their immediate homelessness challenges”); id. § 50213(a)(1), (b), (c)(1) (providing up to $500 million in funding for this program); id. § 50212(a) (requiring most localities to “declare[] a shelter crisis” in “order to be eligible for program funds”).

**Permanent Supportive Housing.** Coalition members have also relied on state funding administered through the California Emergency Solutions and Housing Program ("CESH") and the Tax Credit Allocation Committee to undertake bold visions for increasing permanent supportive housing—which combines affordable housing with critical services for the homeless. The City of Salinas, for example, has devoted millions of dollars from city, county, and state funds to developing 88 units of affordable permanent supportive housing. The commercial space in the lower floors will be reserved for wrap-around services consistent with

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8 Id. at 6.
best practices, including healthcare, mental health, and other key services. But before project development could begin, Salinas had to clear an encampment on the site and keep the site clear during construction.

**Regional Approaches.** Some coalition members have taken a regional approach, working together to maximize efficiency with county-wide housing and service programs. In 2018, after the “lack of regional focus” continued to stymie the implementation of a long-term solution to homelessness in the County of Orange,” the County “and the cities within the county ... worked together ... to establish and authorize the use of an Orange County Housing Finance Trust” to develop housing projects and acquire the “necessary funds for those projects.” 2018 Cal. Stat. 336, § 1(b), (c); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 6539.5(a)(1).

The goal of the Housing Finance Trust is to create 2700 new permanent supportive housing units within the County—1800 of which are currently in the development pipeline.

In 2017, San Diego County established the Innovative Housing Initiative to increase the regional supply of permanent affordable housing. The Initiative provides gap financing and construction loans to developers to build or rehabilitate housing for low-income households and vulnerable populations. To date, the County has committed $50 million to the Initiative, $12 million of which has been allocated to developing 453 permanent affordable housing units.

In 2017, Los Angeles County voters passed a measure to raise about $355 million annually for ten years to fund subsidized housing, coordinated outreach and
shelters, case management, social services, homelessness prevention assistance, and rapid rehousing programs.

**Navigation Centers.** California municipalities have also spent millions of dollars creating and operating “navigation centers,” which are designed to shelter highly vulnerable and long-term homeless individuals who are often fearful of accessing traditional shelter and services. Navigation centers provide unsheltered individuals room and board while case managers work to connect them to jobs, public benefits, health services, and permanent housing options. Unlike many traditional shelters, navigation centers frequently allow homeless individuals to be sheltered with their partners, pets and possessions.

In San Francisco, which pioneered the navigation center model, 57 percent of the nearly 3,000 homeless individuals serviced through the City’s navigation centers as of June 2018 had been provided with housing.9 Numerous California cities are following suit with their own navigation centers.10

**Public-Private Service Partnerships.** Many coalition members are also partnering with non-profits to provide critical services to their unsheltered populations with the ultimate goal of increasing homelessness exits. Orange County, for example, contracted with non-profit organization City Net

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to offer intensive care management and shelter to
individuals encamped in Orange County's Flood Control
Channel. Between July 2017 and February 2018, City
Net provided seven-day-a-week case management
and, as a result, 202 of 623 unsheltered individuals in
the Channel are now housed.

The City of Salinas and many other Bay Area
communities are partnering with the Downtown Streets
Team, a non-profit organization focused on restoring
the dignity and rebuilding the lives of unhoused
individuals. At the Downtown Streets Team, homeless
volunteers work collaboratively on beautification and
cleanup projects in their communities. In exchange,
the volunteers receive a non-cash stipend to help cover
basic needs and access to case management services to
help them find permanent housing and employment.11

**Safe Camping and Parking Sites.** Many California
municipalities provide safe camping sites with 24-
hour security, portable bathrooms, and storage.12 The
City of Salinas has taken a slightly different approach,
leasing private property near the biggest homeless
encampment in the City to provide 24-hour access to
bathrooms and showers. The City plans to contract
with a service provider to deliver wrap-around social
services to homeless individuals. Still other cities are

11 *See* Downtown Streets Team, About, [https://www.streetsteam.org/about](https://www.streetsteam.org/about) (last visited Sept. 21, 2019); Downtown Streets Team, Model, [https://www.streetsteam.org/model](https://www.streetsteam.org/model) (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).

creating public spaces for those living in their cars to prevent them from becoming unsheltered.¹³

**Homeless Outreach Teams.** Cities and counties across California have also developed Homeless Outreach Teams, also known as “HOTs,” which work to assist unsheltered individuals to break the cycle of homelessness. HOTs work around the clock to establish and maintain personal contact with homeless individuals to build trust and make referrals to organizations providing medical and mental health services, housing, and employment opportunities.

C. Despite the efforts of municipalities to adopt creative short-term solutions to assist the unsheltered populations in their communities, in California, most permanent and much temporary housing cannot be constructed quickly. Even where adequate funding and space exists, building many types of shelters and permanent housing generally requires a lengthy land use approval and permitting process, including environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) to address potentially significant environmental impacts. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21151(a), 21080(a), 21100(a).¹⁴

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The California Legislature recently made it easier for certain cities and counties to build homeless shelters during a shelter crisis and for all cities and counties to build navigation centers by exempting both types of shelters from CEQA. See Cal. Gov't Code § 8698.4(a)(4); id. §§ 65660(a) & (b); id. § 65662; id. § 65666. But these relaxed restrictions apply only to temporary housing reserved entirely for the homeless and therefore do not allow bypassing CEQA for permanent housing solutions or temporary mixed housing solutions. See Cal. Gov't Code § 8698.4(a)(2)(B), (b)(1); id. § 65660(a).

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Impedes Municipalities in Their Ongoing Efforts to Assist Homeless Individuals.

Amici now face an entirely new challenge in navigating the homelessness crisis: interpreting and applying the Ninth Circuit’s opinion with the risk of liability for violating the Eighth Amendment. Review is warranted because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is unworkable from a practical standpoint, exposes municipalities to endless and costly litigation over its meaning with little room for error, and casts constitutional doubt on a host of long-established public health and safety laws.

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Unworkable for Municipalities.

The Ninth Circuit’s holding—that public agencies may not enforce laws prohibiting camping or sleeping in public against homeless individuals unless more shelter beds are “practically available” in the “jurisdiction” than the number of homeless individuals—raises a host of unanswered questions as to what “practically available” and “jurisdiction” mean and imposes an
enormous financial and administrative burden on municipalities already working hard to provide short- and long-term assistance for homeless individuals.

1. The Ninth Circuit held that public agencies cannot enforce ordinances prohibiting sleeping outside on public property when no sleeping space is “practically available” in any shelter. Pet. App. 65a. The court explained that a shelter that forces an individual to enroll in “programming that is antithetical to his or her religious beliefs” is not practically available. Pet. App. 48a. But beyond that narrow example, the decision provides little guidance as to what “practically available” means, forcing public agencies to grapple with its meaning in practice and risk substantial civil liability should a court later disagree with that interpretation.

For example, is shelter space “practically available” if it does not accommodate pets? What if beds are available but the shelter cannot accommodate a large amount of personal possessions or the individual’s partner, spouse, or other adult relative? In Amici’s experience, these are common reasons why unsheltered individuals may decline a shelter bed.

By similar token, is shelter space “practically available” to homeless individuals with, for example, post-traumatic stress disorder who decline shelter with unpartitioned sleeping arrangements if only unpartitioned beds are available? One district court in California—relying on the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136-38 (9th Cir. 2006), which was vacated by settlement but essentially re-adopted by the Ninth
Circuit here—seemed to conclude that such shelter would not be “practically available”:

[T]he common assumption that it’s enough for the government simply to make temporary shelter beds available is likely wrong. Even if shelter beds are available, the ability of the government to take enforcement action against homeless people who are camping should depend on the adequacy of conditions in the shelters. This is a particular concern for people with disabilities, who sometimes struggle to see their needs met in temporary shelters.

*Drake v. County of Sonoma*, 304 F. Supp. 3d 856, 857-858 (N.D. Cal. 2018). While *Amici* disagree with this conclusion, the *Drake* opinion illustrates how broadly the Ninth Circuit’s decision could be extended to place immense financial and logistical burdens on public agencies trying to provide services to homeless individuals.

Moreover, does the available sleeping space need to be indoors? In other words, may enforcement officers issue citations to homeless persons who refuse to relocate to another available *outdoor* site where they will not be cited for camping or sleeping in public? While *Amici* assert that the Ninth Circuit’s decision permits “ordinance[s] prohibiting sitting, lying, or sleeping outside at particular times or in particular locations” as well as “ordinance[s] barring the obstruction of public rights of way or the erection of certain structures” (Pet. App. 62a-63a n.8), it is far from clear whether courts applying the decision will agree with that interpretation.
Finally, what if a municipality has shelter beds available for every homeless person it cites for sleeping in public? Does it matter under the Ninth Circuit’s decision whether there are enough shelter beds available for the many unhoused persons the municipality does not cite? Although Amici contend that the citation’s constitutionality under Martin does not turn on sleeping options available to those who are not cited, courts applying the decision may disagree.

2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also leaves public agencies to guess at the meaning of “jurisdiction” in determining whether “there is a greater number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction than the number of available beds in shelters.” Pet. App. 62a. Does it depend on the size of the jurisdiction? What if beds are available nearby in a neighboring city? Some Amici, like Newport Beach, want to partner with neighboring cities to build shelters that serve multiple cities. Others, like Sutter County, rely on bi-county cooperation with neighboring Yuba County. Under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, how are available shelter beds and homeless individuals counted with regional shelters?

Similarly, does the answer change if the property is owned by one municipality but the citation is issued by another? Many California counties provide law enforcement for small cities. If a county sheriff issues a citation in one of those cities, does the citation’s legality turn on the number of homeless individuals and available shelter beds in the city or the county as a whole?

15 See Pet. App. 6a (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehe’g en banc) (explaining that the decision merely forbids criminalizing sleeping somewhere “in public if one has nowhere else to do so” (emphasis added)).
What if a county clears an encampment on county-owned land located within a city? What is the appropriate jurisdiction for purposes of counting homeless individuals and shelter beds? Is it the city where the land is located? The entire county? Or just the small portion of land on which the encampment existed? Sacramento County recently addressed a similar situation on unincorporated county land surrounded by the City of Sacramento. After providing three-months’ notice and offering a wide variety of services, the County cleared the encampment to address multiple public health and safety concerns and to allow for construction of permanent affordable housing.

By overlooking these practical realities, the Ninth Circuit’s decision limits public agencies’ ability to solve homelessness at a regional level without fear of protracted litigation and potential civil liability.

3. Putting aside its interpretive shortcomings, the Ninth Circuit’s decision also raises significant logistical challenges for municipalities.

As Judge Smith observed, the decision “inevitably leads to the question of how local officials ought to know whether” homeless individuals have the choice to sleep indoors because the “number of homeless individuals within a municipality on any given night is not automatically reported and updated in real time.” Pet. App. 16a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). Rather, “volunteers or government employees must painstakingly tally the number of homeless individuals block by block, alley by alley, doorway by doorway.” Ibid. Because of “the daily fluctuations in the homeless population, the [Ninth Circuit’s] opinion
would require this labor-intensive task be done every single day.” Ibid.

Some coalition members are developing ways to reliably track shelter vacancies in real-time, but it will take more time and resources to make such programs operational. And even if these efforts are successful, how are public agencies to determine how many homeless individuals are within their borders on a given evening? If a city “(understandably) lack[s] the resources necessary for such a monumental task,” must it “stop enforcing laws that prohibit public sleeping and camping”? Pet. App. 17a-18a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). Even if a city could “manage to cobble together the resources for such a system, what happens if officials (much less volunteers) miss a homeless individual during their daily count and police issue citations under [a good faith but] false impression that the number of shelter beds exceeds the number of homeless people that night?” Id. at 17a. If a future court agrees with Judge Smith’s reading of “the panel’s opinion, that city has violated the Eighth Amendment, thereby potentially leading to lawsuits for significant monetary damages and other relief.” Ibid.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Leaves Municipalities No Room for Error and Encourages Endless and Costly Litigation.

The Ninth Circuit’s holding that the mere issuance of a citation—even without a conviction—forms the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim compounds the problems identified above. Two plaintiffs in this case “received citations under the ordinances that were dismissed before the state obtained a conviction.” Pet. App. 54a. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that these plaintiffs could still bring an Eighth Amendment claim because they "need demonstrate only the initiation of the criminal process against [them], not a conviction," to bring an Eighth Amendment challenge. Pet. App. 56a.

Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, a local government risks liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983— including potentially attorneys' fees—even when the government subsequently dismisses a citation after determining that, in fact, there were insufficient beds available when the citation was issued. As the dissent warned, the Ninth Circuit's ruling could be interpreted to force local governments to have "absolute confidence that they can house every homeless individual" at the moment a citation is issued (Pet. App. 19a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc)), and "would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell [v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)]." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 400 (1989) (quotation marks omitted).

Such a rule also deviates from other circuits. As one district court recognized, "[w]hile some courts have concluded that a plaintiff has standing to challenge an anti-camping ordinance only if he has been convicted under it, see Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442, 443-45 (5th Cir. 1995), courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that a citation or arrest under an anti-camping ordinance is sufficient to confer standing." Porto v. City of Laguna Beach, No. 8:12-cv-00501-DOC, 2013 WL 2251004, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2013) (citing Jones, 444 F.3d 1118).

Although most district courts have rightly refused to extend the Ninth Circuit’s decision any further, some have read the decision more expansively. One court even stayed enforcement of civil penalties imposed by anti-camping ordinances to “determine whether [Martin’s] rationale concerning criminal sanctions extends to the civil penalties.” See Aitken v. City of Aberdeen, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 3:19-cv-05322-RBL, 2019 WL 2764423, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2019). Similar extensions of the Ninth Circuit’s misguided and unworkable decision are bound to follow unless this Court grants immediate review.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that camping and sleeping in public was "involuntary and inseparable from status" in this case because "human beings are biologically compelled to rest, whether by sitting, lying, or sleeping." Pet. App. 62a. The court explained that "[w]hether some other ordinance is consistent with the Eighth Amendment will depend . . . on whether it punishes a person for lacking the means to live out the 'universal and unavoidable consequences of being human' in the way the ordinance prescribes." Pet. App. 62a-63a n.8.

As the dissenting opinion cautions, this reasoning could be extended to "prevent local governments from enforcing a host of other public health and safety laws, such as those prohibiting public defecation and urination." Pet. App. 6a (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). The Ninth Circuit's reasoning similarly could be extended to "cast[] doubt on public safety laws restricting drug paraphernalia, for the use of hypodermic needles and the like is no less involuntary for the homeless suffering from the scourge of addiction than is their sleeping in public." Ibid. Although the author of the Ninth Circuit's decision stressed the "limited nature of the opinion" in response to Judge Smith's dissent, Pet. App. 3a, as one judge has recognized, "[t]he very day that a doctrine of this nature is announced, a court relinquishes control over its course. Many insidious principles seek innocuous entries, and the majority has no control over how its new rule will be applied." Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264, 294 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Puts California Municipalities to a Hobson’s Choice.

Given the difficulty of interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s decision and the minimal room for error it leaves local public agencies, it is no surprise that “several cities have thrown up their hands and abandoned any attempt to enforce” anti-camping ordinances. Pet. App. 18a-19a n.12 (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (cataloging cities); see also id. at 15a.

But many California counties and cities do not have the option of abandoning enforcement of ordinances prohibiting camping on public property notwithstanding the risk of liability posed by the decision below. Indeed, California’s geography and current climate require municipalities to take proactive steps before an emergency arises to engage in critical fire, flood, and environmental hazard mitigation to protect the unsheltered and sheltered members of their communities alike. Being able to enforce public camping ordinances is essential for municipalities seeking to require those encamped in hazard-prone areas to accept housing services or move to another location where they will not be cited. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in many instances leaves local agencies with a Hobson’s Choice on these critical issues.

A. The Ninth Circuit’s decision threatens local public agencies’ ability to require homeless individuals to accept services or relocate so that critical disaster prevention management strategies can be implemented to protect both unsheltered and sheltered members of the community.

1. Communities across California have been devastated by fires in recent years, resulting in more than 100 fatalities, hundreds of missing people, and $12
billion in property damage.\textsuperscript{16} And scientists predict that fires in the state will only intensify in future years.\textsuperscript{17}

To mitigate the disastrous effects of future fires, California public agencies must engage in proactive fuel management strategies \textit{before} any emergency arises. Yet, the Ninth Circuit's opinion makes it more difficult for local agencies to engage in these essential, proactive fire prevention activities by, for instance, clearing underbrush in areas where there also happen to be homeless encampments. \textit{See Quintero v. City of Santa Cruz,} No. 5:19-cv-01898-EJD, 2019 WL 1924990, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019) ("Multiple fires have occurred in the Encampment since its inception. It is within the public interest for the City to identify health and safety hazards as is the case here and implement solutions and regulations to avoid preventable tragedies.").

Destructive and dangerous fires have threatened encampments in cities across the state, posing a danger to those living in the encampments and the surrounding areas. Several years ago, a fire at an encampment in a high-brush area in Los Angeles spread to 400 acres, eventually destroying the encampment, six

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} See Adam Rogers, \textit{The Only Thing Fire Scientists Are Sure of: This Will Get Worse} (WIRED Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-only-thing-fire-scientists-are-sure-of-this-will-get-worse/.
\end{itemize}
nearby homes and damaging a dozen more. And less than two months ago, a brush fire broke out at an encampment in the San Fernando Valley, causing "pure pandemonium" and leading to the emergency evacuation of 100 unhoused individuals.

2. By similar token, "[t]he number of people ... in California's flood-prone areas is growing, raising ... the threat to public safety." Amici are no stranger to this risk, as "[m]ost of California is vulnerable to floods" and "[e]very county has been declared a flood disaster area multiple times." These flood risks will be compounded by the projected 10 inches in sea level rise expected by 2050.

Just as with fire prevention, it is critical that California public agencies take action to mitigate flood hazards before an emergency arises. Encampments in

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21 Ibid.

flood-prone areas such as riverbeds pose a danger to those living in the encampment and can pose a flood risk in many California cities and counties if officials are unable to enforce public camping ordinances against those who refuse to accept shelter or move to other locations where they will not be cited. For example, a rapid and unprecedented increase in encampments along the American River in Sacramento has impeded officials’ ability to monitor, inspect, maintain, rebuild, repair and operate the levee system, increasing the flood risk to those living in the encampments and others throughout the City. Similarly, before Orange County cleared an encampment of hundreds of homeless individuals along the Santa Ana River, alterations made in the slope and grading along the riverbanks threatened the integrity of the County’s flood control facility.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision makes it more difficult for local agencies in California to address these critical flood mitigation efforts responsibly and proactively without risk of potential civil liability for issuing citations to those refusing to relocate from floodplains. Indeed, one California city has already faced a lawsuit under *Martin* after preventing homeless individuals from entering a flooded encampment site as floodwaters were still receding. See *Butcher v. City of Marysville*, No. 2:18-cv-02765-JAM-CKD, 2019 WL 918203, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019) (plaintiffs “who allege[d] that the City blocked them from entering their encampments ‘at threat of arrest’” had standing to bring Eighth Amendment claim).

**B.** The Ninth Circuit’s decision also puts California municipalities to a similar Hobson’s Choice of risking either potential civil liability or contamination of waterways from improperly disposed human waste.
An increase in fecal coliform levels above the amount allowed in state-issued stormwater runoff permits could endanger the public and expose local public agencies to penalties exceeding $25,000 per day. See Cal. Water Code § 13385(b)(1), (c) (discussing court-imposed and administrative liability); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(3) (discussing administrative fines).

These risks are real. Over the course of merely 12 days in January 2018, for example, Orange County removed approximately 400 pounds of human waste from the Santa Ana River. A 2017 study commissioned by the San Diego Water Board concluded that the most cost-effective approach to improving health at beaches is to prevent human feces from contaminating the region’s watersheds. The study emphasized the importance of reducing “human sources of bacteria which scientists agree have a high likelihood of causing illness by . . . reducing the number of transient encampments near waterways by providing housing in addition to other support services.”

The Ninth Circuit’s decision impedes public agencies’ ability to eliminate these risks. For example, before the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the City of Salinas successfully used the threat of a citation to relocate encampments away from storm drains to ensure the City was meeting its permit requirements and protecting nearby waterways. But after the decision, Salinas must choose between the risk of potential § 1983 liability for relocating encampments away from watercourses.

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or environmental harm and state fines for failing to keep fecal coliform within permitted levels.

C. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also puts local public agencies to the Hobson’s Choice of risking either potential § 1983 liability for enforcing public camping ordinances against homeless individuals who refuse to relocate to another site, or the health and safety of public employees. For example, in August 2019, inspectors with California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Cal/OSHA”) found that city workers at Los Angeles City Hall were exposed to “trash and bodily fluids” on the exterior passageways outside of City Hall where encampments are located.24 Cal/OSHA issued citations to Los Angeles, assessing a combined $1,995 in penalties.25

Similarly, eight months earlier, a pest control company issued a report linking rodent infestation at Los Angeles City Hall to several encampments in the immediate area.26 One City employee who contracted typhus filed a $5-million claim against the City, alleging that the City’s failure to remove garbage and human feces outside City Hall allowed typhus-carrying rats and fleas to thrive.27


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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RYAN P. McGINLEY-STEMPEL
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Counsel for Amici Curiae
California State Association
of Counties and 33 California
Counties and Cities

September 24, 2019
APPENDIX
**APPENDIX**

**List of Amici Curiae**

California State Association of Counties

**California Counties**

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**California Cities**

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Teresa Stricker
Phone: 415.848.7242
Email: tstricker@publiclawgroup.com

RPLG FILES AMICUS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI IN CITY OF BOISE V. MARTIN

SAN FRANCISCO, September 24 – Today, Renne Public Law Group (RPLG), a San Francisco-based law firm that represents local governments, filed an amicus (friend of the court) brief asking the United States Supreme Court to review City of Boise v. Martin, Case No. 19-247—a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that could jeopardize the ability of cities and counties to get people living on the streets into shelters and provide them with the services they need, and to move homeless people camping in hazard-prone areas to safety.

The Ninth Circuit ruled that enforcing local laws prohibiting camping and sleeping on public property “when no sleeping space is practically available in any shelter” within the jurisdiction violates the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Because the standard adopted by the Court is so poorly defined, counties and cities that try to enforce anti-public camping laws could face federal civil rights lawsuits that could cost taxpayers millions and divert public funds away from the ongoing efforts of counties and cities to increase support services and build more shelters and permanent affordable housing.

Although the ruling dealt specifically with the City of Boise, Idaho, it is binding on all federal trial courts in California.

The amicus brief was filed on behalf of the California State Association of Counties (CSAC) and a coalition of 33 concerned California counties and cities: the Counties of Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, Orange, Riverside, San Joaquin, Fresno, Sutter and Del Norte; and the Cities of Sacramento, Covina, Crescent City, Fairfield, Fullerton, Gardena, Glendora, Laguna Beach, La Habra, Lodi, Lompoc, Manhattan Beach, Manteca, Newport Beach, Redondo Beach, Salinas, San Buenaventura, San Rafael, Thousand Oaks, Torrance, Vista, West Covina, Westminster and Whittier.

Despite limited resources, California’s cities and counties are at the forefront of developing ways to provide supportive services to the state’s growing homeless population. As the amicus brief explains: “No one doubts the severity of the nation’s homelessness crisis or the need for more housing and support services. In the face of this crisis, counties and cities throughout California—where nearly half of the nation’s unsheltered population resides—have developed creative and effective solutions and devoted extraordinary resources to provide temporary shelter and social services for homeless individuals while making efforts to build more permanent supportive housing.”
But as the amicus brief points out, the standard that the Ninth Circuit adopted for determining whether a homeless person’s Eighth Amendment rights are violated—whether a shelter bed is “practically available” for each homeless person in the jurisdiction at a given time—is unworkable and raises more questions than it answers. For example, is shelter “practically available” if it does not accommodate large amounts of personal belongings or a homeless person’s partner or spouse? How do counties or cities reliably determine the number of homeless people within their borders so that they know whether they have sufficient shelter beds available at any given moment? How are available shelter beds and homeless people to be counted when it comes to shelters that serve multiple cities or counties? What if a shelter bed is available for the particular person cited for camping in public but not for the many homeless people the city or county has not cited?

“Connecting California’s growing homeless population with much-needed shelter and services is a critical priority for counties and cities throughout the state,” stated RPLG Founding Partner Teresa Stricker, lead counsel for Amici CSAC and coalition members. “The Ninth Circuit’s ill-defined ruling could derail efforts to implement short- and long-term housing and service solutions by fostering endless and costly litigation over the decision’s meaning.”

The Supreme Court is expected to decide whether to hear the case by 2020.

A copy of the amicus brief can be found here. Inquiries to RPLG regarding City of Boise v. Martin should be directed to Teresa Stricker at 415.848.7242 or tstricker@publiclawgroup.com.
September 29, 2019

Torrance City Hall
3031 Torrance Blvd
Torrance, CA 90503

Dear Mayor Furey, Councilmembers, Mr. Leroy Jackson (City Manager), Mr. Patrick Sullivan (City Attorney), and Rebecca Poirier (City Clerk),

I sent a letter or an email to you regarding April 21, 2019 was the scariest day for me on our property because a transient was on our property when it was closed for business. When I drove on to our driveway I noticed him but I didn’t see the long wooden pole with a sickle like blade. I was by myself because we were closed for Easter Sunday. I called 911 and gave the account to the Torrance Police officer but no follow up. Please find enclosed photo of the trespasser.

June 17, 2019 about 8am I was driving out of our property and saw a transient trying to destroy one of our surveillance cameras on the front of our property. He was yelling and looked agitated but when I yelled and honked my horn he stopped. He just walked away and disappeared in minutes. This is the same transient that came on our property on April 21st with the long wooden pole with a sickle like blade.

I called 911 and Officer LaLonde responded to my call. Before he spoke to me the security guard at the Kings Hawaiian Bakery and The Loco Place spoke to Officer LaLonde. The security guard informed the Officer LaLonde that this transient was demanding food at the restaurant in other words causing a disturbance.

Officer LaLonde said prior to my call this transient was causing a disturbance at the Courtyard Marriott on 190th.

Officer LaLonde said he is aware of this transient and knew his name. Officer LaLonde said if I see this transient damaging our property then this is a crime. Since the transient stopped when I yelled at him and there was no damage to the surveillance camera; therefore there is no crime.

I told Officer LaLonde that the April 21st incident scared the “hell” out of me because this transient was carrying the pole with the sickle type of blade. Officer LaLonde said this is a business that is open to the public so trespassing is when you ask the person to leave but they don’t. Since the transient left the property on April 21st then this was not trespassing.

Officer LaLonde said this transient is mentally ill. I asked Officer LaLonde if this transient would hurt me and he said he didn’t know. Now if this happened to your wife, daughter or friend what would you do?

A week later I saw this transient riding his bicycle passed our property about 5:30am. I assume nothing was done or he was not affected by what was done to him when he caused the three disturbances on June 17th.
About 3-4 weeks ago a worker said this transient was on our property checking out the trucks parked on the property. The workers can identify this transient because I have shown them a photo of him. Our business also has a house on the property and there are times I am by myself like on April 21st when the transient came on the property with a long pole with a sickle like blade. I do not know what his intentions were on that day.

Community Lead Officer (CLO) Stephen Kim gave a presentation at the Social Service Commission meeting on June 27, 2019. “He explained that his team had been reduced to a team of two from four and he often had to work on patrol as well. He stated that the issue of homelessness has risen to priority one for the Police, due to the volume of calls, complaints and concern from the community. He reported that in 2014 the number of 911 calls for service from the Community in regard to the homeless population were 300 per quarter and had steadily increased to 700-800 calls per quarter in 2019. He noted that during his patrol shift, one in three calls concerned the homeless.” Refer to Social Service Commission June 27, 2109 minutes, torranceca.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=53194

I am requesting the Torrance City Council come up with a STRATEGY that will come up with solutions to the homelessness. The yearly increase of the homeless count indicates no solutions have been working.

TORRANCE HOMELESS COUNTS:

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>146 (36% increase)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>188 (29% increase)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>226 (18% increase)</td>
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A major problem is transients cannot be forced to take advantage of any resources offered. This is an issue that needs to be addressed otherwise this problem will never be resolved. I recommend the City Council form a Task Force to address the current crisis. The entities could be Experts, Residents, City Employees, Torrance Police, PTA, Teachers, Neighborhood Watch and others.

Sincerely,

Yoko Patsy Okada

Enclosure (1)